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Does the armed forces of America reflect the rest of
American society? This study indicates that the formation
of the U. S. all-volunteer service was a direct result of
societal pressures which commenced prior to the Vietnam
conflict. The basis for an all-volunteer force is to be
found in the general decline of mass armies in association
with the question of legitimacy. The Vietnam conflict
became the finale to the U.S.'s decline process. The mili-
tary has attempted to appease a number of current social
trends, such as service conditions, women in the services,
and the isolation syndrome; however, emerging societal pres-
sures remain unnoticed. The all-volunteer service is here
to stay; however, its quantity and quality will rely upon
the ability of the military to recognize and adjust to emerg-
ing societal pressures. Emerging societal pressures have
been identified and possible solutions have been recommended
including a detailed examination and possible adoption of a
British regimental type organization. In conclusion, a seven
step flow procedure is recommended to ensure that alienation
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The decision to end peacetime conscription in the United
States and to rely instead entirely on volunteers to meet the
manpower needs of the armed services of the country must be
considered as one of the most controversial defense policies
undertaken in recent years. There is still no firm consensus
on either the feasibility or the desirability of having an all-
volunteer force.
Without leverage provided by the old draft, the military
services must now meet the same conditions in the labor market
as civilian employers. What is most significant about a climate
of an all-volunteer force is that the services must now compete
in the open market for the loyalties and abilities of America's
young men and with schools, universities, unions, and business.
The question is: Is Department of Defense (DoD) prepared and
is it capable of meeting the competition?
The U.S. Defense Manpower Commission in its report dated
19 April 1976 states:
"The prospects for sustaining DoD. annual requirements
for new enlisted manpower from 1976 through 1985 will
be affected by the dominant demographic, economic, and
social conditions prevailing during the next decade."
[Defense Manpower Commission, 1976. p. 386.]
The Commission's report, however, only attempts to expand
on two of the three key points, demographic and economic
conditions. The report and its five volumes of staff studies

and supporting papers make little attempt to predict, examine
or even isolate areas of obvious social change.
The Commission recognized that the prime supply pool for
enlistments is considered to be non-prior service (NPS) 18-
year-olds. The Bureau of the Census projects that the 18-year-
old male population in the United States will decline 15.1 per-
cent between July 1975 and 1985. This decline is an aftershock
of the post-war "baby boom." [Defense Manpower Commission/ 1976.]
However, if during this same period of time, American society un-
dergoes a social and cultural change and military service is
deemed to be immoral, then the size of the NPS pool will be of
little consequence.
Traditional mores and patterns within the industrial society
have given way to new rules of the game. Dr. Daniel Yankelovich,
educator and research psychologist, once stated:
"Never have changes come so thick and fast and on every
front. The economy is changing; the population mix in
the country is changing; the political climate is chang-
ing . . . people are changing in complex ways that are
difficult to understand, and yet, unless one understands
the human side of the future, it's impossible to make
sense of anything else . . . There is less rigid accept-
ance of authority of any group . . . less personal pre-
judice against people who dress differently, think
differently, or hold different points of view."
[Killian, 1976 . p. 23]
DoD managers should be aware of these social changes
and respond to them in a positive manner, or face the risk
of an isolated military.

Due to the controversial nature of the decision to aban-
don the draft and adopt an all-volunteer force, books and articles
on the subject abound. Little emphasis, however, has been placed
on the societal influences which confront today's modern mili-
tary forces.
A. METHODOLOGY AND PURPOSE
Normally an experimental thesis will follow a predetermined
formal sequence of hypothesis formulation, recognition of depen-
dent and independent variables, testing the hypothesis and end-
ing with a conclusion of the findings. This thesis, however,
is not of an experimental nature, but rather designed to assist
military managers in their understanding of the need to adjust
service life and its organization to the needs and social de-
mands of society.
The bibliography of this thesis has been expanded to include
as many references as possible pertaining to the subject of the
transition of the U. S. forces from a draft environment to one
of all volunteers.
Since the author's parent service is the Australian Army,
one may question his intentions in studying the U. S. services.
Firstly, in reply one can offer the argument that the society
which closest emulates Australian society is that of the United
States.
"Australians and Americans have quite parallel attitudes
to material benefits and economic growth. Both have an
optimism based on a deep belief in their own destiny, on
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evidence of wealth, and by comparison with other ad-
vanced countries an experience of public suffering, of
invasion or defeat, or even violent revolution. Australians
have gone almost as far as Americans in accepting a deeply
rationalist approach to social organization and progress,
based perhaps on the pioneering influences which have
helped to shape both nations."
[Gelber, 1970. p. 88]
The societal pressures upon the U. S. services will even-
tually cause the services to adopt certain changes if they wish
to remain an all-volunteer force. These societal pressures will
eventually face the Australian Defense planners, although their
adoption will not be as critical due to the minor position Aus-
tralia holds in world politics and also due to the fact that only
5.18 persons per 1,000 people in Australia belong to the armed
forces. In the U.S. this figure is 9.97. These figures are
from the year 1975. [U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
1976.]
It is not advocated, however, that Australia merely adopt
the methods employed by the U.S. in dealing with the various
social pressures. But at least errors, if made in the U.S.,
may be avoided in Australia.
The recommendation is that if Australia is forewarned about
the direction of possible future societal pressures, then De-
fense planners can adapt the American experiences to the Aus-




This thesis is primarily based on a comprehensive literature
review, as well as a number of structured interviews. Government
publications, technical reports, research papers, Department of
Defense official documents, books, magazine articles, and various
unpublished papers have been reviewed. Structured interviews and
informal discussions were held with members of the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) , Army Research In-
stitute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) , and Mr.
Morris Janowitz, Distinguished Professor, University of Chicago.
For the assistance provided by the above the author is indeed
grateful
.
The purpose of the thesis is fourfold. Firstly, to indicate
that the formation of the U.S. all-volunteer service was a direct
result of societal pressure. Secondly, that there is a need for
the services to take note of current societal pressures. These
pressures are examined in detail. Thirdly, possible courses of
action are discussed, indicating to the services possible solutions
which may enable them to adapt to the known societal pressures.
Finally, it is hoped that Australian defense planners may bene-
fit from America's experience in her attempt to resolve her
societal pressures.
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This section presents a brief and concise summary of the
emergence of conscription (i.e. the draft) as a solution to the
12

problem of military manpower procurement. The first modern
conscription law was adopted by France during the French
Revolution. Most major European nations adopted this practice
of conscription during the nineteenth century.
The early colonists in America brought with them from
England the militia concept. This meant that every able-
bodied person should be armed and ready to fight whenever the
occasion demanded. In Jamestown from 1607 until 1775, when the
American Revolution began, conscription of one type or another
was called for in a number of laws and ordinances. But during
the Revolutionary Wars the volunteer system failed to stimulate
enlistment; bounties of various types were offered including
clothing, land, and even money. In 1777, Massachusetts and Vir-
ginia resorted to conscription. By February, 1778, only about
two-thirds of the authorized Continental Army had been recruited
and Washington recommended to the Continental Congress that the
necessary men be obtained by universal conscription in all the
colonies. [Little, 1969.]
Limited conscription was used in America up until the Civil
War, when out of necessity both sides resomed to the practice.
On March 3, 1863, Congress passed the first conscription act.
There was much public resentment to this law, and the first
drawing of names in 18 63 was accompanied by riots in a number
of cities, the worst being in New York, resulting in a number
of deaths and severe property damage.
13

Prior to the continuation of the history of conscription
in the U.S., there is a need to outline the opposing views
as to what should be the composition of a military force. On
the one hand, the professional military requires an effective
standing army with additional emergency strength from the re-
cruitment of volunteers. The other position is that in a crisis
the nation must not depend on a standing army, but rather upon
a citizen trained army.
These opposing views clashed in 1916, resulting in the
National Defense Act, which set up a blueprint for an in-
creased regular military establishment. The professional mili-
tary had won.
Early in 1917 it became obvious that America must begin
to prepare for war. The Selective Service Law was prepared
and presented to Congress the day after war was declared in
April, 1917. The law was eventually passed after a bitter six-
week debate in which the bill was alleged as being unconsti-
tutional and soldier slavery. All together the law registered
24 million Americans, selected and inducted nearly 3 million,
and was so successful that it required only three minor revisions
during its period of applicability. [Lockmiller, 1955.]
14

Planning for future emergencies began in 1926, when the
Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee was convened.
The committee proposed "An Act to Provide for the Common Defense
by Increasing the Personnel of the Armed Forces of the United
States and Providing for Its Training," which called for regis-
tration of all males between the ages of 21 and 35. President
Roosevelt appointed a civilian, Dr. Clarence Dykstra, the first
Director of Selective Service in 1940. The President felt that
legislation calling for induction of men in peacetime needed a
civilian director to inspire public confidence.
Dr. Dykstra resigned in 1941 and was replaced by Lieutenant
Colonel Lewis B. Hershey.
During the period of emergency from November, 1940, to
October 31, 1946, more than 10 million men were inducted.
After the War, President Truman recommended to Congress
that the Act be permitted to expire on March 31, 1947. The
Congress agreed and passed a law which provided for the reten-
tion of a nucleus of Selective Service personnel for protection
against national emergencies. Thus, the U.S. depended solely
on enlistments for maintaining the posture of the services.
However, this situation only lasted fifteen months.
For four years President Truman tried unsuccessfully to have
Congress pass a Universal Military Training Act which would
provide one year of training to all American men. This issue
always fostered bitter debate, but the Cold War crisis forced
15

the Congress to enact the Selective Service Act of 1948. Thus,
for the first time in American history, men were drafted into the
Armed Forces during peacetime.
The 1948 Act provided for a period of service of 21 months.
All men between the ages of 18 and 26 were required to register.
The law provided that highschool students could continue their
study, if their work was satisfactory, until graduation, or until
they reached the age of 20, whichever was first. Youths in the
18-year-old category were allowed to enlist for one year (limit
of 161,000 per year) and avoid the draft by joining the Reserves
for six years. College and university students could have induc-
tion postponed until the end of the Academic Year.
After January, 1949, the Armed Forces were able to obtain the
required manpower and the draft calls were cancelled, but regis-
tration and classifications continued. The value of this continu-
ation of registration and classification paid off when inductions
were forced to resume within 6 days after the Korean hostilities
began.
The Selective Service Act of 1948 was succeeded by the Univer-
sal Military Training and Service Act of 1951. This Act in general
increased the sources of manpower available for induction by re-
stricting certain deferments and extending the service period to
24 months. The Universal Military Training and Service Act was ex-
tended in June, 1955, until July, 1959. A further extension until
July 1, 1967, was granted by Public Law 88-2.
16

During the mid-1960 's, Professor Milton Friedman, of the
University of Chicago's Department of Economics, advocated
an all-volunteer force for conservative, market-place econo-
mic reasons. The military, he said, could get more than enough
volunteers by making a more attractive offer. Friedman's free-
market argument impressed Richard Nixon who was getting ready
to run for President of the United States in 1968. Friedman
was associated with a number of men who were advising Nixon
on campaign issues. Nixon realized that the all-volunteer idea
had great popular appeal, as it promised an end to the draft,
which was hated for its own sake.
In the spring of 1969, Nixon, now President, appointed a
fifteen-man commission to develop a detailed plan for moving
to an all-volunteer force. The chairman was Thomas S. Gates,
who had once been Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration. The completed report was sent to President Nixon
on February 20, 1970. [Bliven, 1975.]
The recommendations of the Commission could best be sum-
marized in chairman Gates' covering letter*
"We unanimously believe that the nation's interests
will be better served by an all-volunteer force, sup-
ported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a
mixed force of volunteers and conscripts, ..."
[U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed
Force, 1970. p. iii.]
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In 1971 the Selective Service System was extended for two
more years to June 30, 1973. Finally in December 1972, the
last draft call was issued and the draft officially ended on
Sunday, June 30, 197 3.
C. SUMMARY
For almost two hundred years the United States had no
experience with compulsory military service except in con-
nection with major wars. Thus, compulsory service has been
closely associated in the public mind with total national
emergencies. 1948 saw Congress authorize the induction of
men for a period of military service in time of peace.
Each time conscription bills have been presented in the
Congress they have faced heated debate, clearly indicating
that at least a portion of the American society is against
the induction of men into forced military service.
This situation has been reflected elsewhere in the wes-




II. DECLINE OF MASS ARMIES
It may appear ironic to speak of the decline of the mass
army, when peace-time armed forces are greater and defense
expenditure is higher than ever before. In 197 5 an estimated
26 million persons were on active military service through-
out the world and total military dollar expenditure amounted
to more than US$345 billion compared to approximately US$285 bil-
lion in 1966. [U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976.]
A. DEFINITION OF MASS ARMY
An analysis of the term "mass army" is needed if its de-
cline is to be fully understood. The word "mass" has at least
three different meanings. [Doom, 1975.]
The first meaning indicates physical size. This one is
the most obvious, and indicates a numerical size and was first
used in connection with large-scale armed forces used in the
nineteenth century. This increase in size was closely con-
nected with the rise of nationalism. In Europe, during the
French Revolution, the mass armed forces developed professional
cadres augmented by conscripts and a system of reserves. The
idea developed that citizenship involves the right and the
duty to bear arms in defense of the nation. This was a poli-
tical and social development.
The second interpretation of "mass" indicates homogeneity,
that is an army with a highly undifferentiated and homogeneous
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composition. The composition of the Roman legions is a good
historical example. Today the infantry is still less dif-
ferentiated and internally specialized than the remainder of
the army
.
Thirdly, "mass" indicating a social entity characterized
by social mobilization. Here "mass" has a similar interpre-
tation as in the term "mass media." Mass armies have contri-
buted in a sense to the emergence of mass societies, i.e.,
societies capable of mobilizing their members for large-scale
objectives. Kirchheimer in a paper in the American Political
Science Review, expressed an opinion that World War I, a war of
mass armies par excellence, taught the political leaders how to
mobilize great masses of people and resources, a technique which
was later utilized in peace for domestic purposes. [Kirchheimer,
1965.]
Using each of the three meanings, it is possible to indi-
cate that a decline in the mass army concept has taken place.
B. DECLINE PROCESS
Firstly, there has been a reduction of military forces in
a number of West European countries. This reduction in mili-
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U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-
1975, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., December 1976.
In 1960, Great Britain introduced an all-volunteer mili-
tary system. Currently further reductions may be forced upon
the British Military by economic considerations. The Nether-
lands is planning an all volunteer force. In nations where
there is conscription, such as France and West Germany, the
trend appears to be toward an emphasis on volunteer elements
as well as a shorter engagement period for conscripts.
This process of decline could best be summarized by Morris
Janowitz
:
"In advanced industrialized societies, the goals
of military institutions have been subjected to
massive criticism and belief in the moral worth
of conscript service has been shaken. Hedonism,
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self-expression, resistance to military authority
and a new diffuse moral criticism have become para-
mount among young people. The use of force has tra-
ditionally operated within circumscribed limits; new
moral and political definitions generate a powerful sense
of neutralism and new forms of pacificism. Literacy,
mass consumption and political rhetoric have emerged
as more important hallmarks of citizenship than mili-
tary service. Nationalism itself is muted and mixed with
diffuse but powerful feelings of transnationalism.
"
[Janowitz, 1972. p. 430.]
If conscription means larger armies, then the reverse
is also true. Ending conscription means smaller armed forces.
The all-volunteer force was introduced and accepted, primarily
because of the political and social pressures caused by resis-
tance to the military.
Using the second meaning of "Mass" a decline in homogeneity
is also present. In today's modern army, the infantry is but a
small portion. Technological advances, increased firepower, im-
proved mobility, and improved communications have resulted in
new specialists skills, and so today modern battlefields may
be empty of soldiers.
The development of nuclear weapons has seen the decline of
mass armies. The introduction of nuclear weapons per se did
not dictate the gradual erosion of mass armies, it was perhaps,
a necessary catalyst. Not only has it introduced new skills and
dispersal tactics, its destructive potential has served not only
to produce moral opposition to violence but has also been
responsible for new pacifist movements.
22

Viewed in terms of the third definition, the decline of the
mass army may be regarded as a lessening of political power.
Air warfare has meant that entire populations are targets for
military operations, because of this political leaders must em-
ploy the full support of military and civilian populations. To
gain such support in a social environment of anti-war feelings
would be extremely difficult.
Underlying all three interpretations of the decline of mass
armies is the concept of social legitimacy.
C. LEGITIMACY
Legitimacy has a long history, especially in the field of
constitutional law. Max Weber was among the first to introduce
legitimacy into sociology. The view, adopted in this thesis is
that "legitimacy is the capacity of a social or political system
to develop and maintain a general belief that the existing social
order and its main institutions are generally appropriate."
[Doom, 1975. p. 90.]
There are at least two dimensions of legitimacy: intensity
and extent. Intensity refers to the degree of identification or
acceptance perceived in the mind of a particular individual. It
could probably be measured roughly by the sacrifice the indivi-
dual is prepared to make in the name of a particular institution.
The extent of legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to the pro-
portion of the relevant population which regards the institution
in question as legitimate.
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The most powerful legitimate type of institution is a
nation. Within the United States government, the DoD wields
a great deal of authority. DoD has a "total budget larger than
the national income of the Peoples Republic of China and can
well claim to be the second largest centrally planned economy
in the world." [Tax, 1966. p. 193.]
Men are urged, "ask not what your country can do for you,
ask what you can do for your country." However, such cliches
are now being questioned, and rightly so.
The draft may well have been the first question, which in
turn may have commenced the slow decline of the military in-
stitution.
Doom has indicated that the legitimacy of the armed forces
was guaranteed as long as:
" (1) the function of the military coincided sufficiently
with what the political community defined as legitimate
goals; (2) the military sub-culture coincided sufficiently
with the political culture of the larger unit; and (3) the
composition of the armed forces was sufficiently repre-
sentee of the composition of the political community."
[Doom, 1975. p. 95.]
The intervention of U.S. troops into South Vietnam must be
considered as a violation of Doom's first principle. The as-
pacts associated with South Vietnam will be considered else-
where in this thesis.
The third of Doom's principles may also have been violated.
The draft discriminates against the moderately poor. The very
poor usually escape because they may lack educational background,
24

while the rich may escape because they are able to receive
deferments on educational grounds.
For the majority of nations most armed forces accept their
subordinancy to the political culture and regard themselves as
loyal to the ruling political regimes. A few notable exceptions
may be found among the newer developing nations. Thus Doom's
second principle has not been violated.
It could be hypothesized that the adoption of an all-volunteer
armed force in the U.S. acted as a societal "safety-valve."
The U.S.'s DoD because of its power and wealth would seem
to be invincible. History, however, suggests that it is at this
moment of apparent invincibility that an institution is most vul-
nerable. The Roman Empire and the British Monarchy lost their
legitimacy at thier moment of greatest power and extent. People
began to ask, "what can the king do for me?" When the answer
resulted in "nothing," the monarchy either died or was trans-
formed. [Tax, 1966.]
It may have been fortuitous that the United States adopted
an all-volunteer approach to military manpower procurement when
she did.
Since the introduction of the all-volunteer system roughly
coincided with the withdrawal of U. S. troops from South Viet-
nam, one must question what social influence did South Vietnam




The influence of the war in Southeast Asia can be viewed
from the following areas:
1. A general societal overview, and
2. Dissent from within the services.
Since the dissent from within the services was probably
a spill-over of the views held by the general society, these
general views will be discussed first.
1. Society's Outlook on the South Vietnam War
Janowitz mentioned that there has been an erosion of
nationalism since World War II. The memory of the accomplish-
ments of the war has grown dim with time, while on the other
hand the memory of the war's tremendous destruction has re-
mained vivid.
Increased literacy and education have popularized values
associated with internationalism. People believe that collabo-
ration among nations, not military antagonism, is the key to the
future.
The Vietnam conflict, especially with its vivid media
coverage provided a strong emotional base from which to build
pacifism and anti-military movements.
From 1960 to 1970 the U.S. Military with her vast re-
sources was unable to impose a containment policy in South Viet-
nam. As a result many Americans were tempted to think the
military was not much good.
26

However, one should consider that although the U.S.
did not suffer military defeat in Vietnam, she was denied
victory because the situation was without a purely military
solution. Technically, the U.S. could have won militarily
by having recourse to nuclear weapons. The price and results
of such an action made this clearly a non-option.
This lack of faith in the military may have helped to
shake the moral worth of conscription. The draft appeared
unnecessary, mainly because the military was ineffective.
Other problems resulting from the Vietnam conflict
can be summarized as follows:
1. Widespread and serious questioning of the morality of the
use of armed force, particularly in the employment of non-
combatants. Military force is seen by many as a blunt,
insensitive and even immoral instrument.
2. Hostility toward large bureaucracies, a general feeling of
dissatisfaction with what are considered obsolete bureau-
cratic structures, insensitive administrators and slow
procedures. Bureaucracies are seen to be capable of only
marginal adjustments, not much needed innovations.
3. A desire for greater informality and personal freedom for
members of the military.
4. The military because of its vital combat operations, stresses
discipline and obedience. But incidents like the one at My
Lai tend to result in a social abhorrence of obedience to
what is regarded as arbitrary authority. [Gard, 1971.]
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The Vietnam conflict in itself merely continued the
decline process of the U.S. military. It possibly was the
"last straw which broke the camel's back" and forced the
military to accept the political program of an all-volunteer
force. The professional military was also probably influenced
by the dissent which was widespread throughout enlisted per-
sonnel during the period 1960-70.
2 . Dissent from Within
This dissent from within the forces has commonly been
termed the GI movement and represents the most serious inter-
nal challenge ever faced by the Armerican armed forces.
The level of dissent is reflected in the number of
desertions in recent years. The five peak years of the Ameri-
can involvement in Vietnam saw the Army desertion rate increase
from 14.9 incidents per thousand in 1966 to 73.5 per thousand
in 1971. This represents an increase of approximately 4 00
percent. For the armed forces over the same period, the deser-
tion rate increased threefold from 8.4 to 33.9 per thousand.
[Cortright, 1975.]
Desertions of course are typical from any military en-
vironment, but the above figures surpass those experienced by
the American services during and after both the Korean War
and World War II. Cortright also indicates that most Vietnam-
era desertions did not take place under fire, indicating that
servicemen "took off" not because of danger involved in the

war but rather because of disgust. Although no statistical
evidence is provided to support this remark it is neverthe-
less interesting and feasible if one considers the general
social environment prevailing at the time.
This overflow from society is also evident in the
characteristics of the society. There are certain new char-
acteristics of the social environment. Western society has
raised the expectations of the masses and the individual.
Young people believe education entitles them to more material
rewards and a greater portion of the good life instantly.
There is a psychology of entitlement which the services have
not adjusted to. The lack of privacy and the relatively
spartan life-style just do not appeal to many who are accustomed
to material comforts in an affluent society. Consequently,
when individuals having this psychology of entitlement are
placed within this new alien environment, especially when it
is not by choice, a reaction against authority is to be ex-
pected. This reaction or dissent became the GI movment. This
movement was supported by some 24 5 separate illegal GI news-
papers. [Cortright, 1975.]
The Gates Commission felt that a means of alleviating
this dissent and the social pressures from within the military
itself, which they felt resulted directly from the draft, was
to eliminate the cause and adopt a volunteer system.
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"The draft creates unnecessary problems for the
military. Selection by lottery compels some to
serve who have neither a talent nor a taste for
military life . . . These men present morale and
disciplinary problems which otherwise would not
arise. Some spend much of their military service
in confinement/ because it is so difficult for them
to adjust to military service. Dissent within the
military presents particularly ticklish problems for
the armed forces of a free nation. The problems
raised by the forced military service of those who
are unwilling or unable to adjust to military life
will be largely overcome by voluntary recruiting."
[U. S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer
Armed Force, 1970. p. 32.]
Thus the all-volunteer force has been used as a means
of changing the social base of the military in an effort to
eliminate unrest.
Unfortunately, the end of the draft did not halt the
GI movement. The assumption by the Gates Commission that volun-
teers would be more docile and acquiescent than draftees has
proved wrong. Dissent still prevails. The conclusion from
this is that the military must attempt to adjust its environ-
ment so that it is compatible with the social environment
prevailing at any particular time.
E. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER II
Chapter II highlights the difficult challenge facing the
U.S. military, that is how can it achieve two often conflict-
ing objectives? The U.S. services have the mission of provid-
ing for the military security of the United States, yet they
must accommodate the present values of the society they protect,
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An attempt has been made in the chapter to show that there
has been an overall decline in size of mass armies within the
western nations. This decline, which had its origins years
ago in Europe has spread to America. It is not a new concept
which merely resulted from America's intervention into South
Vietnam, but rather it has been a gradual process, forced upon
the political and military leaders by societies that they repre-
sent.
America has not been an exception to this general decline
process. The process probably started prior to the Vietnam
conflict, but remained dormant. The death toll in the war,
considered by many to be needless, merely brought the process
to a climax.
In summary, the condition of society directly determines the
state of morale within the armed forces. Servicemen recruited
or drafted from a society in turmoil are unlikely to bring with
them the sense of dedication and loyalty required by a discipline-
oriented organization such as the military. Racial tensions, drug
abuse, alcoholism, crime, a lack of unity and purpose, together
with other signs of social disintegration show up in the military
with devastating results. It is contended that a military force
can not make a nation strong if it consistently ignores the cri-
tical social needs of the community. America, like Europe, sub-
ordinated the interests of the government to those of the people,




III. ADOPTION OF CURRENT SOCIAL TRENDS BY THE U.S. MILITARY
The previous chapter could convey the impression that
the services have made no attempt to resolve the social is-
sues other than accept and implement an all-volunteer system
of manpower procurement. This is not so; a number of programs
have been implemented in an attempt to adjust to the social
environment. A concerted effort has been made by all the ser-
vices to try and improve the general conditions under which
service personnel serve.
A. IMPROVEMENTS IN SERVICE CONDITIONS
The Nixon administration's first move to try and improve
service morale was the appointment of the President's Commis-
sion on the All-Volunteer Force, now generally referred to as
the Gates Commission. The Commission with its terms of refer-
ence was announced on 27 March 1969 by the President in the
following manner:
"to achieve the goal of an all-volunteer force we
will require the best efforts of our military establish-
ment and the best advice, we can obtain from eminent
citizens and experts in many related fields of national
endeavor ... I have directed the Commission to develop
a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and
moving toward an all-volunteer armed force."
[U. S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer
Armed Force, 1970. p. vii.]
From this command to the Commission, the recommendation of
an all-volunteer force would be obvious, hence the only task
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for the Commission was to justify the transition and provide
incentive methods to attract young men to a military career.
The main incentive recommended by the Commission was increased
pay. This, of course, when implemented provided initial in-
centives, increased morale of the soldiers, and satisfied
those members of society who supported the all-volunteer concept.
The Commission's report had little effect in raising the
low social attitude felt towards the services. The society
-
still maintained its low opinion of the forces, and once this
attitude became generally accepted, a descending spiral seemed
to take hold. The lower the value placed on the military by
the public, the fewer good men are attracted to the forces. The
fewer good men in the forces, the more derogatory the opinion
of society about the military. [Rosser, 1972.]
The efforts of the Gates Commission at least attempted to
raise the morale of the soldiers, and this must have had some
effect in lowering the dissent from v/ithin the armed forces.
Additional efforts were made to lower dissent from v/ithin the
services, the major ones being:
1. May, 1970, the Army announced that appearance regulations
would be revised to allow slightly longer hair.
2. A new emphasis on personnel problems in the Navy was at-
tempted with the surprise appointment of Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt as Chief of Naval Operations in April, 197 0.
Zumwalt was promoted over thirty-three other admirals.
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[Cortright, 1975.] Zumwalt through a series of highly
publicized personal messages announced the relaxation of
uniform regulations, approval of beer in the barracks, the
opening of hard rock clubs, liberalized leave policies,
and a ban on all forms of unnecessary harassments.
3. Army Chief Westmoreland in December, 1970, followed the
Navy with directives eliminating morning reveille, easing
pass restrictions, and legalizing beer in mess halls.
4. In the Fall of 1970 the Army instituted a controversial
"amnesty" program whereby soldiers with drug problems
were encouraged to enter a rehabilitation program, with
the promise that no punitive action would be taken against
participants.
The effect of these human relation programs are difficult
to judge. They probably had some effect, but their "fire fight-
ing" nature probably prevented the full objectives of the pro-
grams from being realized.
The U.S. forces faced with the task of recovering from
the problems of the Vietnam era, coupled with the transition to
the all-volunteer force, have only had time to adopt a "fire
fighting" approach to the endemic problems, such as drugs and
racial animosity. Under the circumstances, the effort must be
applauded. However, if the forces are to be successful in re-
gaining both the soldier's and society's confidence, a coordi-
nated systems approach is needed at the highest DoD level.
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Evidence of successful programs are available at various
command levels. These successful programs should be researched
and if applicable applied force wide. One of the efforts at a
local command level worthy of investigation was that carried out
by Major General Bernard Rogers at Fort Carson. General Rogers
preceded the Army directives, and in early 197 abolished re-
veille, Saturday inspections, and allowed soldiers to decorate
their living quarters in whatever manner they wished.
The most far-reaching of the General's new policies was an
attempt to introduce a measure of enlisted men's participation
into personnel policies. Sp5 William Rosendahl was appointed "En-
listed Assistant to the General." His task was to function as a
top-level representative of low-ranking GIs and to investigate
the complaints of enlisted people. The incumbent was provided
with a secretary, telephone, staff car, and had direct access to
the post commander. [Cortright, 1975.] This ombudsman position,
if extended, could be a step towards achieving a more humane and
democratic military, acceptable to the society in general.
Of all the new policies resulting from the decline of mili-
tary service, none is more striking than the Pentagon's decision
to increase the number of women in the military.
B. WOMEN IN THE SERVICES
In the transition to an all-volunteer force, increased empha-




The total number of women on active service has increased
from 14,458 in 1948 gradually to an estimated expected number
of 130,700 in 1978. These figures represent 1.0% of the total
military force in 1948 and 6.2% of the proposed military force
in 1978. [Defense Manpower Commission Staff Studies and Sup-
porting Papers, 1976. Vol. IV.]
The history of women in the U. S. Army provides an insight
into the employment of women into the services.
1 . History
The formal organization of women into the U.S. services
was in 1901 when the Army Nurse Corps was formed. This new
Army Nurse Corps was not an integral part of the Army, but rather
an aixiliary whose members were denied many of the regular service
benefits, such as rank, officer status, or equal pay. The end
of World War I saw the end of the question of women in the Army.
World War II resulted in the formal recognition of
women into the armed forces. The bill to establish the Women's
Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was approved by Congress on 14 May
1942, a year after its introduction to the House of Representa-
tives. The major opposition to the bill was similar to those
fears being expressed today; namely, "reduction in a force's
efficiency, concern for women's safety, and perceived inability
of women to cope in combat situations." [Castle, 1976. p. 12.]
With the termination of hostilities in 1945, it was felt




February 1946 there was a critical shortage of skilled
military personnel, and legislation was prepared to re-establish
the Women's Army Corps (WAC) . This was done by means of the
Women's Armed Services Integration Act.
The Korean War saw the strength of the WAC increased
due to the need for volunteers for that war zone. An increase
was also experienced as a result of the Vietnam conflict. WAC
volunteers served in Vietnam in clerical and administrative
functions.
The preceding outline emphasizes that acceptance of
women in the military in the past has always been as a last
resort in times of crisis. What explanation can be given for
the large number of women currently employed in the armed
forces?
2 . Current Utilization of Women
The projected number of women to be employed in the
services in 1978 is 130,700. There are legal restrictions
which prohibit the use of women in combat roles within the
services, but what about other roles?
"In 1971, 8 6% of the Army's enlisted women were
concentrated in four traditional career fields
—
41% in administration, 31% in medical care and
treatment, with 14% in the communications and
supply fields. It can be seen from these figures
that actually 72% of the women were concentrated in
only two career fields."




This concentration of women into selected employment is
not the fault of the services. For example as recently as 1972
approximately twenty-five percent of the Army's Military Occu-
pational Specialties (MOS) were open to women. Today approxi-
mately 92% of the Army's MOS ' s are available to women. This
represents a total of 403 MOS ' s out of 438. The problem faced
by service manpower planners is that women are still remaining
in traditional women's roles. Here is an example where the
military has attempted to adjust to social pressure, but where
in fact they may have progressed too far. Society may not be
willing to allow women beyond these traditional roles within the
military environment.
In assessing the employment of women in the military,
one must consider whether their employment has been linked with
society's attitudes on the employment of women, or that the in-
crease is due to a shortfall of men resulting from the all-
volunteer recruitment system.
If the latter is the case, and bearing in mind that pre-
vious employment of women in the services has been as a result
of a crisis, it follows that the all-volunteer system must be
considered by military planners as a crisis. If this hypothesis
is accepted, then adjustments must be planned to correct the
situation. To the author's knowledge no adjustments are immi-




Having dispensed with the notion that the utilization
of women in the services is solely a result of the all-volunteer
concept, one must consider the sociological aspects.
3 . Sociological Aspects to the Acceptance of Women in the
Services
Brig. Gen. Clarke, Director WAC, referred in January
197 6 to a quotation about equality. "The world of humanity
has two wings: one is women and the other men. Not until
both wings are equal can the bird fly." [Johannessen, 1976.]
Society has begun to accept the role of women, and
cases of women performing satisfactorily in male-dominated
careers are no longer newsworthy. The full benefit of women
in the military depends upon society's acceptance of women
in combat.
An attempt to try and assess society's attitude to
combat was undertaken by The Women in the Army Study Group
[1976] . Various segments of the civilian and military popula-
tion were surveyed and their attitudes were compared and
analyzed.
Questions asked in the surveys on the role of combat
were classified into two categories:
1. The philosophical (or "should" they participate) and
2. The pragmatical (or "can" they participate)
.
In 1973 a survey of persons eighteen years of age or
more residing in the Detroit area was conducted by the University
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of Michigan in an attempt to answer the philosophical question.
The survey found that approximately 74% of the sample agreed
that men rather than women should bear arms.
In an attempt to answer the pragmatical question, re-
searchers usually address the question of the ability of women
to serve in a combat role. Women surprisingly have less confi-
dence in themselves than men have in them as to their perceived
ability to perform as good frontline soldiers. Other topics
surveyed included command, leadership, and job performance.
Survey results suggest that men actually support women
in command positions, but not as strongly as do women, particu-
larly the female officers. Twenty percent of the women surveyed
indicated they believed the overall effectiveness of the army
would increase if more women held command positions. On the
topic of job performance, men generally believe that women per-
form given tasks well.
The conclusion from this section on women is that the
general upsurge in the number of women being currently employed
in the armed forces is not merely the result of a lack of men,
due to the all-volunteer concept, but rather a general accept-
ance of the role of women in society. The full utilization of
women in the service can not be undertaken until the societal
attitude on the use of women in a combat role is resolved.
An interesting sideline to the question of the employ-
ment of women in the armed forces is the assertive male su-
periority, which to some members is an essential element of
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military culture, and which plays a key role in conditioning
hostility and insensitivity among servicemen. This topic
could be a thesis study in itself.
C. ISOLATION SYNDROME
A constantly used argument against the all-volunteer is
the concern about the isolation of the military. People argue
that men in an all-volunteer force would be self-selected;
this could result in a force composed of undesirable psycholo-
gical types. A mercenary army might develop. The men in the
military might begin to serve the military's interests against
those of society. Even in an armed force of draftees, the ca-
reerists must also be considered mercenaries.
Many fear the growth of a separate military ethos which
could pose a threat to civilian authority, the nation's free-
dom, and its democratic institutions. Critics of the all-
volunteer concept feel that the high turnover of manpower
generated by the draft is a healthy phenomenon. The continual
flow of men in and out of the forces provide a link between
services and the civilian society and prevents the growth of
a separate military ethos. It can not be denied that the above
flow is not a healthy one; however, as to the establishment of
a military ethos, this could best be countered in the terms of
the Gates Commission:
"men in both forces will be largely the same types . .
.
the men who join the volunteer force will not all
become long service professionals. An estimated
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215,000 men will leave after serving a single tour.
As a result, about half the men in the volunteer
force will be in their first tour of duty. The
large infusion of new men will help insure that nei-
ther force becomes isolated from society."
[U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer
Armed Force, 1970. p. 135.]
It can also be argued that a transition to an all-volunteer
force may not be the only incentive for an organization to be-
come isolated. "Isolation is an attractive defense mechanism
for any organization under attack by other organizations or by
society. 'Close Ranks' is a natural cry." [Rosser, 1973.
p. 157.]
The isolation of the military into its often-isolated
bases can occur as a result of society's hostility shown to
the forces during the Vietnam conflict. Such an isolation atti-
tude could probably develop if a severe reduction in appropri-
ations for the armed forces was to occur. Hence is is maintained
that the threat of isolation by the military from the rest of
society is nearly always present.
The inference of an isolated military divorced from society
is that such a situation is intolerable. This may not be so.
Huntington has argued that:
"The very isolation and rejection which reduced the
size of the services and hampered technological
advance made these same years (1870-1900) the most
fertile, creative and formative in the history of
the American armed forces. Sacrificing power and
influence, withdrawing into its own hard shell, the
officer corps was able and permitted to develop a
distinctive military character. The American military
profession, its institutions and its ideals, is
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fundamentally a product of these years. No other
period has had such a decisive influence in shaping
the course of American military professionalism
and the nature of the American mind. The practical
work of professional reform, frustrated while the
military were associated with the South in the pre-
war years, became possible once all ties with civilian
society had been broken. Universal hostility per-
mitted what limited support prevented. The founda-
tion of this advance was the absence of any signi-
ficant threat to national security. The isolation
of the military was a prerequisite to professioni-
zation and peace was a prerequisite to isolation.
Paradoxically the United States could only create a
professional military force when it was lacking
any immediate need for such a force. The dark ages
of military political influence were the golden ages
of military professionalism. The withdrawal of the
military from civilian society at the end of the nine-
teenth century produced the high standards of profes-
sional excellence essential to national success in the
struggles of the twentieth century."
[Huntington, 1964. p. 229.]
Rejection of the military by society and consequent reduc-
tion of funds may in fact have startling results. To continue
Huntington
:
"The shortage of funds made it impossible for the
military to experiment and develop new techniques
and weapons of warfare. Both services, for example,
continued to use smoothbore cannon long after foreign
powers had replaced them with rifled cannon. The Army
was seldom able to bring together more than a battalion
of troops at a time; the Navy after the Civil War went
back under canvas, and the desire for economy made it
almost a crime for a naval officer to utilize the en-
gines of his ship."
[Huntington, 1964. p. 226.]
With such historical evidence it is difficult to avoid the
conclusion that we should attempt to reconstruct the same en-
vironment so as to reap the same rewards today.
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There are even some who consider that the problem does
not appear to be military isolation from the civilian com-
munity, but rather the reverse. It can be argued that man's
tendency towards increased social involvement and concern
is a danger to national security and the military profession,
in that the unique characteristics and capabilities of the
profession may become eroded beyond repair by over immersion
in such a rapidly changing value system.
In order to maintain armed forces in the future, some
suggest it is necessary to blur its functional role in an
array of increased social-welfare responsibilities so that
the forces may come to be regarded as just another part of
the government. The military must avoid this process at all
cost and maintain the values of order and discipline. These
values are absolutely necessary if the forces are to maintain
and provide national security.
There is considerable evidence that the current military
bases tend to isolate the military profession from the larger
civilian society. Bases have been established in which all
the service houses together with associated amenities are lo-
cated in one area or camp. This does not mean to imply that
these benefits are not essential for military personnel and
are extremely important for retention purposes. However, it must
have some effect on not ensuring integration of the military
families into the general society.
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In an attempt to assimilate, DoD in recent years has
sought to expand off-base housing under the assumption that
such facilities are less expensive, or that they relieve the
military of the complex of overhead activities associated with
military community housing, thus releasing much needed per-
sonnel for other military directed tasks.
It can be argued that purely relocation of a solider's
residence into a civilian community will not ensure integration
into that civilian neighborhood. It may, in fact, produce an
off-base ghetto of military families who may be disgruntled
at being separated from their base facilities, such as their
medical care and exchange privileges. Hence, there is no
reason to believe that relocation of the military into off-
base housing enhances integration of the military family into
civilian society. Off-base housing is unlikely to be a suc-
cess so long as the high rate of service rotation persists.
The question of integration into civilian society by the
military could best be considered as rather a question of civic
participation rather than location of housing.
1. Civic Participation
Military regulations and practice encourages civic
participation within the boundaries of nonpartisanship, i.e.
without direct affiliation to political party groups. Currently




The service way of life is not naturally conducive to
civic participation. High rotation from one duty station to
another, the long working hours particularly over the weekends,
and the frequency at which the head of the household is absent
all hamper the military family from becoming involved in com-
munity projects and associations.
As discussed elsewhere in the thesis the introduction
of a regimental system with less job rotation may increase the
possibilities for more meaningful community integration.
Janowitz [1972] supports the case that "military per-
sonnel should be permitted to serve on local school boards, run
in non-partisan local elections, and be members of government
advisory boards and public panels," if they possess the essential
qualification, competence and interest.
In West Germany, all military personnel are permitted
to stand for political elections while still serving on active
duty. Thus, the army man is a civilian in uniform. To swing
the pendulum to this extreme in the U.S. may present a number
of problems. The need to avoid a political party affiliation is
probably warranted.
A charge often leveled at serving members of an all-
volunteer force is that they are "mercenaries." Military per-
sonnel are highly sensitive to such a charge, thus they should
have the right to express the objectives and purposes of the
military within a democratic society by becoming deeply involved
in community and public affairs. "In short, new definitions
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of civic participation need to emerge which are broader than
the existing ones, but still compatible with the non-partisan
stance of American military law and traditions." [Janowitz,
1972. p. 114.]
Prior to attempting to define the role of the new
military, as a result of all-volunteer procurement, there is
a need to establish the social composition of an all-volunteer
force.
2 . Social Composition of an All-Volunteer Force
The characteristics of the military establishment as
a result of all-volunteer recruitment can be summarized as
follows:
* The armed forces will be smaller than the U.S.
has had since before the Korean War.
* The forces will be increasingly non-white in
complexion.
* It will be well paid.
* As a result of the percentage of the budget going to
manpower, the direction will be for an increase in
a capital intensive force.
* Enlisted personnel will perhaps have fewer years of
formal education. Other aspects of quality may also
suffer
.
* A smaller proportion of national resources will prob-
ably be assigned to National Security than at any
time over the last decade.
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These characteristics will have a marked effect on
the composition of both the enlisted ranks and the officer
corps.
a. Changes in the Enlisted Ranks
The Gates Commission posed the following answer
to the question, that the higher pay required for a voluntary
force will be especially appealing to blacks who may have re-
latively poorer civilian opportunities.
"The frequently heard claim that a volunteer force
will be all black or all this or all that simply
has no basis in fact. Our research indicates that
the composition of the armed forces will not be
fundamentally changed by ending conscription."
[U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer
Armed Force, 1970. p. 15.]
The Congressional Quarterly reports that during
1976 blacks made up 16.6 percent of the U.S. enlisted forces
and 3.4 percent of the Officer Corps. Both levels are sub-
stantially above the corresponding ratios of 1964 when 9.7
percent were enlisted and 1.8 percent were officers. [Towell,
1977.]
This increase in the proportion of blacks in the
armed forces is automatically felt to be bad. This high ratio,
people feel, will exacerbate racial tensions within the ser-
vices and provide in the form of ex-soldiers a military-trained
group to foment violence. Perhaps there is something to this.
The argument to the contrary rests on a more basic question
of principle. Clearly, it is a good thing not a bad thing to
offer better alternatives to the currently disadvantaged.
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On the question of quality, the Gates Commission
concluded:
"Maintenance of current mental, physical, and
moral standards for enlistment will ensure that
a better paid volunteer force will not recruit
an undue proportion of youths from disadvantaged
backgrounds .
"
[U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer
Armed Force, 1970. p. 16.]
A study contracted by the Institute for Defense
Analyses counters the above findings of the Gates Commission.
Based on a detailed statistical comparison of civilian and
military employment earning potential, the Institute report
concludes: (1) non-high school graduates suffer a financial
loss if they choose civilian employment over continued mili-
tary service; (2) enlisted men who have attended college ex-
perience a financial loss if they remain in military service;
(3) military and civilian earnings for high school graduates
are roughly the same; and (4) military earnings for blacks
with a high school education or less will far exceed their
earnings in the civilian labor force.
If the assumption holds true that social groups
will generally behave in their own economic self-interest,
the potential members for the volunteer force will mainly
be drawn from the less educated and minority groups of society
[Kim, et al. , 1971.]
The current standards will have to be lowered if
DoD is to maintain the current manpower level at an acceptable
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cost level. Army Secretary Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., told
the House Armed Services Committee that because the Army fell
6 percent below its goal of 62 percent high school graduates
in fiscal year 1976, it would have to spend an additional $71
million through fiscal 1979 to cover the costs of recruiting
and training replacements for those non-graduates, who it was
predicted would be early drop-outs. The proportion of Army
recruits holding high school degrees dropped from 67 percent
in 1964 to 50 percent in 1974, and all services showed declines
in recruit quality during the first quarter of 1977. [Towell,
1977.]
The Pentagon has estimated that out of the 10.6
million men between the ages of 17 and 21 in the U.S. at the
commencement of 1977, only 7.3 million would be physically
qualified for military service. [Towell, 1977.] In order to
increase the supply pool, DoD may be forces to lower standards.
In support for the all-volunteer force, the Gates
Commission looked at recent experiences in other countries
operating under a volunteer system. The Commission concluded:
"The recent experience of the British, Australian and Canadian
Armed Forces suggest that competitive wages will attract an
adequate quantity and quality of volunteers."
The number of service personnal per 1,000 of popu-
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Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-
1975, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., December 1976.
Since the ratios of the three comparison countries
are much lower, it is no wonder they are able to attract ade-
quate volunteers.
The British experience notes that typical recruits
are untrained school-leavers coming from older and impoverished
urban areas. Over a third of "British volunteers join the
armed forces before their seventeenth birthday." [Lee, 1971.
pp. 28-33.]
Thus, in conclusion, the volunteer would be expected
to fall somewhere between that expected by the Gates Commission
and that of an all-black or all-poor force.
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b. Changes in the Officer Corps
Changes in the social base for officers are more
difficult to predict than changes in the enlisted ranks.
The service academies have increased the size of
the student body at these institutions. This ploy is probably
designed to off-set an expected reduction from Recruit Officer
Training Centres (ROTC) , which currently supplies the majority
of officers.
ROTC units at prestige colleges and universities
have decreased in number as a result of anti-military agitation.
Such a move would most likely restrict recruitment of ROTC
cadets coming from upper or middle class backgrounds.
The expansion of the armed forces over the last
twenty years has increased not only the number of military
families, but also the number of military dependents. Exces-
sive selection from these military families must result in a
separation of the Officer Corps from civilian society by limit-
ing the basis of social recruitment.
European experience has shown that a decline in the
proportion of commissioned officers coming from the ranks oc-
curs with an all-volunteer force. [Hackel, 197 0.] If the
same pattern will occur in the U.S. remains to be seen.
3 . Models of the Emergent Military
Charles Moskos explains that, "underlying much of social
change theory are developmental constructs that are implicit
predictions of an emerging social order; for example, a
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classless society, a bureaucratic society/ a garrison state."
His paper attempts to predict the shape of the military in
the future.
Three models are presented by Moskos. One extreme
indicates a military organization highly differentiated from
civilian society, while a military system highly convergent
with civilian structures is at the other end of the scale.
Several levels of variation are evident, resulting
in the convergence or divergence of the military from society.
These are:
1. The way in which the membership of the armed forces is
representative of the overall society.
2. The degree to which there are institutional parallels
between civilian structures and the social organization
of the military.
3. The differences in required skills between military and
civilian occupations.
4. The degree of difference between ideological similarities
between military and civilian men.
Because of these variables, data collection to support
a case for either convergence or divergence is difficult. How-
ever, Moskos presents three developmental models.
a. Model 1: The Convergent or Civilianized Military
This model suggests an all-volunteer democratic
military, where the life styles of service personnel will be
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the same as those of the civilians. The civilianization pro-
cess began after World War II and has been given impetus by
the domestic turbulence of the Vietnam conflict years.
The process resulted from the need for men in the
services to operate new weapon systems which resulted from
technological advances. Leaders trained in managerial and modern
decision-making skills were needed to replace charismatic leaders.
The Cold War era saw Morris Janowitz ' s comprehen-
sive study, "The Professional Soldier," in which he stated that
the military trend was away from authority based on "domination"
toward a managerial philosophy stressing persuasion and indivi-
dual initiative.
Internal dissent during the Vietnam conflict aw
attempts by the military command to institute programs designed
to accommodate the new emerging youth values. These have al-
ready been discussed earlier in section A of this chapter.
The next convergent step is that of collective
bargaining. This step has already been taken in several Wes-
tern European countries, with the formation of military trade
unions. The introduction of trade unions into the U.S. service
environment is a topic of discussion in Chapter IV.
The other end of Moskos's continuum is the diver-
gent or traditional military.
b. Model II: The Divergent or Traditional Military
Evidence can be found to support this model.
There is a move towards the traditional model which attempts
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to isolate itself from society. Indicators of this growing
divergence are summarized here.
Firstly, recruitment of the officer corps no
longer provides a representative sample of the American popu-
lation. Disproportionate numbers of new officers are coming
from rural and small town backgrounds. The number of cadets
at service academies who come from career military families
is increasing. [Moskos, 1973.]
Secondly, the draft forced into the enlisted ranks
certain numbers of upper class recruits; thus, there was less
of a caste-like distinction between officers and enlisted men
due to education equality. With the poorer and less educated
being attracted by the pay incentives of an all-volunteer sys-
tem, a divergence in the caste system may result.
The third indication of a divergent military is
the return to traditional occupations within the services. The
return to traditional occupations is a result of the increased
technical specialization cost associated with such specializa-
tion.
Since the portion of the Defense Budget allocated
to personnel represents approximately 60%, there has been con-
siderable effort directed to replacing men with machines. It
has often been the technical jobs, such as specialized radio
operators, warning systems personnel which have been replaced,
thus freeing personnel for traditional combat tasks.
55

Fourth, the divergence has been helped by the
number of privileges which have been extended to the service-
man and his family. These privileges include free medical,
housing support, PX and commissary shopping. Service personnel
in order to obtain the best benefit from these privileges tend
to isolate themselves within their post community.
Finally, there is a widespread mood among career
officers and noncommissioned officers that the armed forces
have been made the convenient scapegoat for the failure of the
Vietnam conflict, although such a mood is difficult to document
and support.
All the above indicators support the fact that the
military is undergoing a change, a change often unfortunately
supported by the military.
"There was, at one time, a great hesitancy by most
officers to accept many of society's contemporary
values and goals. Today many are accepted without
strong objection. We veered from those tried and
proven attitudes, values and goals, saying, 'Times
have changed.' Little by little, it appears that
our entire course has been changed because we are losing
sight of the reason for our existence."
[Dunwell, 1977. pp. 60-61.]
Such a change may not be in the Nation's best
interests
.
c. Model III: The Segmented or Pluralistic Military
Moskos explains his third model simply that "the
pluralistic military will be both convergent and divergent
with civilian society. It will simultaneously display organi-
zational trends which are civilianized and traditional." The
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model does not adopt the central position between Model 1
and Model II , rather the military will be segmented into areas
which will be either convergent or divergent. For example,
the Air Force may move towards a civilianization concept , while
the Marine Corps will continue its traditional approach to
military service.
From this concept may develop two militaries, each
organized along opposite lines and both having recruiting ap-
peal from different elements of society, but the overall military
would have as its supply pool the entire society, not just an
element as would be the case with either Model I or Model II.
The civilianized military might be responsible
for nonmilitary objectives, such as job training, health care
services, restoring ecologically devastated resources, and as-
sisting with natural disaster relief programs.
The alternatives are there. A decision should be
made at the highest level in order that a coordinated effort
can be directed to ensure that resources are correctly allocated
to programs that support the objectives.
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IV. PROCESSES FOR APPEASING SOCIAL PRESSURES
This chapter provides an insight into those areas in
which adjustments are needed in order to appease strong
social pressures. The assumption underlying most of the
proposed solutions is that the armed forces will remain on
an all-volunteer base. It is hoped that the implementation
of the recommended solutions will result in an increase in
the number of recruits entering the armed forces and a closer
harmony of civilian-military relations.
A. CASTE SYSTEM
To the enlisted man nothing is more of a harassment in
military life than the military caste system. The officer-
enlisted distinction which places the officers in a special
position requires investigation and adjustment.
There are five reasons generally given for maintaining
this officer-enlistment system.
First, it must be a valid concept because it is universal.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is perhaps the only
country which has made a serious attempt to institute caste
reforms. Programs have been established whereby officers re-
turn to the ranks. This program is intended to purify the
officer corps of tendencies towards elitism and "bourgeois
military thinking." By December 1962 it was claimed that over
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771,000 army officers had served as privates in the ranks.
[Gittings. 1967.] However, unexamined tradition is not an
adequate justification for its continuation in the armed
forces of today.
Second, the system has withstood the test of time, which
may indicate the system is superior to alternate plans, but
today's environment means a new "ball-game" and the "game"
is not the same with different "rules."
Third, the system is necessary to maintain standards of
authority and discipline, especially under combat conditions.
In the days of muskets and close-order drill, this may have
been true. Today often those being shot at are officers who
have been ordered into combat by other officers, a system far
removed from earlier days. This example applies to the majority
of men who serve in the Air Force. Also the role of the non-
commissioned officer is that of ordering and leading men into
combat
.
Available evidence casts considerable doubt on the value
of military discipline as a factor relevant to combat motivation
The basic drive of self-preservation, the desire to return home
safely, and mutual bonds with a buddy provide the soldier his
main combat motivation. •
A team of social scientists, headed by Samuel Stouffers,
during World War II conducted a survey on combat motivation.
When asked to select the factor "most important to you in
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making you want to keep going," enlisted men identified leader-
ship and discipline least of all the incentives listed. Only
one per cent considered it their primary means of motivation.
Compare this to the response given by officers when asked to
name what they thought was most important to the troops. The
officers considered discipline. It was selected most frequently
by 19 per cent. [Stouffers, et. al., 1949.]
The Stouffer studies were confirmed by sociologist, Roger
Little, who observed Army units in Korea. Little concluded
that solidarity among small groups was the most important factor
in explaining the behavior of enlisted men in combat. [Little,
1964.]
A study of Vietnam GIs by Charles Moskos [1969] saw combat
troops being concerned only with their own personal survival.
Studies such as the above indicate that strict military discipline
need not contribute to combat effectiveness.
An account of the final reported mutiny in Vietnam can be
used as an example of where traditional disciplinary methods
were forsaken for a newer realistic approach.
The incident occurred at Phu Bai during the April 1972
Easter offensive. Troops of C Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st
Infantry of the 196th Brigade were ordered to patrol enemy
territory. About one hundred of the GIs refused, considering
the mission too dangerous. The battalion commander, Lieutenant
Colonel Frederick Mitchell, finally got the men to agree to
advance. "The men were convinced not by threat of court-martial,
60

but by learning that their refusal would endanger A Company;
to protect their buddies, the soldiers reluctantly moved into
the field." [Cortright, 1975. p. 38.]
Fourth, once the separation between officers and enlisted
was based on functional differences. Differences in class,
education, skills, and experience once assisted a separation
process.
These areas of differentiation have gradually been eroded.
The only remaining requirement for officers is education.
Since the education gap is closing, as more and more young men
attend college, does the system remain valid? Examples can be
cited, especially during the draft, when in fact enlisted men
had formal education well above that of many of their fellow
officers
.
With the advances made in technology, there is an increasing
need for the services to recruit persons with higher levels of
education, in order to maintain the complex weapon systems. A
solution to this problem is to give such qualified men a com-
mission. The disadvantage to such a program is that it only
serves to emphasize the two-class system. This requirement
for well educated enlisted personnel is a real problem as these
men and women would prefer service without the attached social
stigma of being enlisted personnel.
Fifth, the argument is often used that a two-class system is
needed in order to get competent people to join the armed forces
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Rewards and privileges of the officer class are used as moti-
vational incentives. Reasons for the caste system were probably
once valid. However/ in today's environment, which is tending
towards the recognition of a classless society, is such a sys-
tem warranted?
B. MILITARY JUSTICE
Military discipline and training originated from times
when mass armies had to face each other under fire in the open.
Thus, a strict code of justice was required. With the passing of
time, new technology has seen contingencies added to the law to
such an extent that the Code of Military Justice has become a
complex maze. The sorting out of this maze is a costly admini-
strative burden, one which the services could well do without.
DoD has attempted to make reforms. The Navy, for example,
now provides legal counsel to the accused at summary courts
martial (courts martial tried by one officer) . Where no counsel
is available, there can be no judgment for prison terms, a fair
and just reform, but a costly one.
Contentious areas of military justice still remain as re-
corded by Anthony De Stefano:
"The so-called 'Devil's Article,' article 134 of the
Code of Military Justice, is so named because it is
vague, non-specific, and elastic enough to make many
trivial offenses punishable by court martial. It is
the closest thing in the military to 'Catch-22,* and,
despite several attempts to have the article struck
down as unconstitutional the courts have upheld the use
of this part of the code."
[De Stefano, 1976. p. 562.]
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Servicemen and women recruited from a society which is
increasingly skeptical of authority and established institu-
tions must eventually rebel against the arbitrary punitive
methods of the military. The soldier no longer needs set di-
rection/ the new weapons systems require greater skills,
abilities, and require individual initiative on the part of the
operators.
A recommended alternative may be found in the study of the
West Germany military law as pertaining to military discipline,
March 15, 1957.
The Germans have made a serious attempt to incorporate humane
principles into their penal code:
"The regulation pertaining to military discipline
[Military Law] is supposed to be not only an admini-
strative order for the punishment of duty violations,
but also is considered an educational means to be used
to encourage the soldier to conscientiously fulfill
his official duties and to prepare himself for the
difficult employment his service must be expected to be
in case of war. As a rule punishment should be used
only after corrective instructions, admonition, and
reprimand have failed to succeed. Educational means
include not only reprimands and punishment, but also
expressions of praise and appreciation."
[Waldman, 1964. p. 84.]
The German Military Penal Code is restricted purely to
military violations; this is a conscious attempt to avoid dif-
ferent treatment of citizens with civilian or military status.
Also, all legal proceedings against soldiers are handled by
normal civil courts and not, as in most nations, by special
military courts or war tribunals. This might appear an
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excellent arrangement, but is implementation requires control.
Many cases in Germany have been drawn out to such an extent
that, for example, draftees have often received punishment for a
serious offense after finishing military service obligation.
The German example provides an alternative to the inadequate
U. S. system. An alternative worthy of further investigation
by U. S. military planners.
C. DEMOCRATIZATION
U.S. society today is very individualistic in nature and
enjoys the freedoms associated with a democratic society. The
youth of today demand individual treatment. If the armed forces
can not satisfy these two demands, then obtaining recruits will
be difficult for the armed forces.
The principle of military democracy was established at the
end of World War II. Western civilization, in an attempt to pre-
vent future re-occurrence of nazi war barbarities, adopted at
Nuremberg a code of individual moral responsibility by appeal-
ing to the basic ideals of humanity. Consequently, the soldier's
allegiance to the institution must not supersede his fundamental
obligation to the standards of law and morality.
The ultimate defense against militarism became the principle
of personal accountability. This principle guarantees soldiers
the right to question the functioning of the military to ensure
it has the support of the society from which it is drawn. This
principle has been adopted in writing by West Germany.
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The Soldier's Law, the basic internal code of the Bundeswehr,
is a system developed on the notion that the individual soldier
must be given not only the right, but the responsibility, to
think and act independently.
The Military Complaints Order details:
"The right and freedom [of the soldier] to complain
belongs to the fundamental legal protections of the
military service. Every soldier must have the right
to appeal to a superior office to obtain protection
from injustice suffered by him . . . No soldier may
suffer any disadvantage because of the fact that he
has complained."
[Waldman, 1964. p. 82.]
The Military Complaints Order is supported by the Law Per-
taining to the Election of Soldier's Representatives. This law
requires every small unit to elect a soldier to function as an
intermediary between the soldiers and the unit commander. The
unit commander must listen to the intermediary at any time and is
not permitted to administer punishment or commendation until he
has consulted the representative of the soldiers.
The reasoning behind this democratic procedure is that good
obedience requires mutual confidence and respect between super-
ior and subordinate. It also protects the soldier from orders
which he believes are against his morals, either as a citizen
or a soldier.
Other democratic processes have been used in other countries,
such as the Service Ombudsman as employed in Norway, Australia,





The function of an ombudsman is normally to investigate
individual grievances arising from the administration of an
act, regulation, order or instruction which wholly or in part
affects the rights of individuals. With a service ombudsman the
individual can be either a member of the service, an ex-member, or
eligible dependants. The service ombudsman will not normally
investigate complaints related to the rights of persons as
citizens.
a. Swedish Experience
Sweden pioneered the ombudsman system. The country
has had a civil ombudsman since 18 09. When World War I started,
Sweden introduced conscription and increased her military bud-
get. Public opinion demanded controls in these areas and as a
result the Office of Ombudsman for military affairs was created
in 1915. It was specifically stated that the Military Ombudsman
(MO) should be a non-military personage to preserve the impar-
tial nature of the office. In 1967 the office of the Civil and
MO were combined.
The MO and a deputy are appointed by the Swedish
Parliament for a four year term and they operate independently
of both the executive and parliament. The MO receives no par-
liamentary direction and can decide himself which subjects he
investigates and what action is necessary. However, he must
submit an annual report to Parliament and this, together with
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relevant documents, is subject to scrutiny by a parliamentary
committee. The MO has no power to change an official decision,
however he can prosecute for an indictable offence.
b. Australia's Defense Force Ombudsman (DFO)
Australia joined the ranks of countries with mili-
tary ombudsman, when on 2 January 197 5 the Minister for Defense
appointed a DFO.
The jurisdiction of Australia's DFO is as follows:
"All members on continuous or part-time service,
ex-members, and eligible dependants of ex-members
of the Defense Force will be able to refer matters
to the DFO which they believe infringe the rights
they have accrued because of their service with the
Defence Force."
[Report of the Defence Force Ombudsman for Period
25 December 1975 to 25 November 1976, 1976. Appen-
dix A.]
Prior to the DFO, the soldier had the provision to
seek a redress of wrongs through the chain of command, or the
"de facto" system by addressing complaints direct to the Mini-
ster of Defense. Members using the chain of command system
have frequently been frustrated by delays and lack of informa-
tion, which reflected badly upon the efficiency of the system,
and in some cases indicated an unfortunate lack of concern.
Although the legal right to complain exists, there has been
general reluctance to exercise that right for fear of reprisals.
These factors resulted in a decline in the use of the redress
system, and an increase in frequency in the use of the minister-
ial representations which, apart from the increased administrative
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load involved, is indicative of a breakdown of the important
chain of command principle.
The unique relationship between leader and led in a
fighting force makes it imperative that the chain of command has
the right to act on a complaint before the complaint is referred
to a higher and external authority. The DFO Bill thus includes
the requirement for a soldier to seek redress, first through the
chain of command, and if he is not satisfied with the answer, or
if after 28 days from seeking redress he is dissatisfied with the
progress of his application, he may refer it to the DFO.
The biggest advantage of the DFO is that once a matter
is accepted for inquiry, the DFO will conduct an independent
and private investigation and will determine whether or not the
substance of the complaint warrants some form of corrective ac-
tion. If such action is required the DFO will refer the matter
to the Minister and to the relevant area of the Defense Depart-
ment where the required action can be taken.
The DFO could be likened to a union appeals system
representing some employee's complaint against management, but
with the advantage of being able to have access to management's
records, action, and policies, etc. Impartiality and independ-
ence are the DFO ' s main advantage. Of prime concern to the
enlisted personnel is that no disciplinary action can be taken
against members who seek to correct a grievance through the DFO.
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Another advantage of the ombudsman system is that
all levels of military management are aware that their actions
in treating a grievance have the possibility of being examined
by the DFO should the soldier so choose. The chain of command
system appears more concerned in processing any complaints or
grievances than they did prior to the DFO.
The U. S. Army may consider that it has its own
ombudsman in the Inspector General's Department and/or the
Sergeant Major of the U. S. Army.
c. Inspector General's Department of the U.S. Army
In 1813/ the U. S. Army formed the Inspector Gene-
ral's Department; it is a staff organization and one of its many
functions is to receive complaints of any kind from U. S. Army
personnel and civilian employees.
All personnel are entitled to register grievances
directly with an Inspector General (IG) officer instead of tak-
ing them up with their immediate superiors. After investigation
of a grievance, the IG officer recommends action to the relevant
commanding officer. If the complainant is not satisfied, he
may appeal to an IG officer at a higher echelon. Studies indi-
cate that it is not completely successful. Its function and
effectiveness are treated with suspicion as it is a uniformed
staff department and individuals fear reprisals, or are inhibited
by rank structure from registering complaints. Probably as a
result of this, the U. S. Chaplain's Department has acquired
an unofficial function in handling grievances.
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d. The Sergeant Major of the U. S. Army
The Sergeant Major of the U. S. Army is a personal
advisor and assistant to the Army Chief of Staff on matters
concerning enlisted men. In addition, he has some representa-
tional duties. He is able to present a point of view, but it
is not necessarily that of the individual serviceman, nor has he
any power to investigate individual complaints. He is not an
ombudsman in its true sense.
The establishment of a service ombudsman is an at-
tempt to provide the individual service member with a means
whereby grievances can be aired. This is a fundamental right
of individuals in a democratic society and hence should not be
denied to service personnel. With a demand for civil liberties
throughout society and with the current values and norms prevail-
ing in civilian industry, a move toward military unions in the
United States comes as no surprise.
2 . Military Unionization
Union membership and military careerism have proved com-
patible in the military establishments of several Western Euro-
pean countries, notably Germany and Sweden. While unionization
is alien to America's military, it is contagious.
The current interest in unionization stems from a num-
ber of sources.
First, the serviceman's dissatisfaction with his lot,




Second, the successful introduction of unions into the
forces of NATO allies.
Third, the fact that union leaders have "seen the dis-
sent and discontent within the services and have offered union
representation.
Fourth, the increase in union membership among other
government type unions.
Fifth, the increase in the number of professions which
are slowly turning towards unions as a means of obtaining bet-
ter employment conditions.
Finally, the staunch opposition raised against military
unionization, both by service and government leaders has had an
opposite effect and has maintained the union issue "at the boil."
American commanders argue that unions would undermine
military discipline and are unnecessary. This has not been
the case with America's NATO allies.
a. Collective Bargaining within the Swedish Armed
Forces
The Swedish armed forces union resulted from the
1965 "State Officials Act." This act "extended the private
sector's collective bargaining rights over salaries and work-
ing conditions to nearly all national civil servants, including
armed forces member." [Defense Manpower Commission: Organizing
The Military Services Into a Union, 1975. Appendix II, p. 6.]
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Unions exist for officers, noncommissioned officers,
warrant officers, and draftees, each coordinating with each
other and bargaining with civilian public employee unions to ob-
tain improved pay and benefits.
The military unions may not strike or negotiate mat-
ters of selection, tenure and retirement.
Accomplishments of the unions have been:
* Increases in pay for lower-ranked officers, as high as
8%, per annum.
* Establishment of a 31-grade uniform salary scale for all
Swedish national public employees, military and civilians.
* Marked increases in soldier morale.
[Defense Manpower Commission: Organizing the Military Ser-
vices Into a Union, 197 5.]
b. Unionization in the Netherlands
In July 1966, an Association of Draftees (V.V.D.M.)
was organized in an effort by draftees to protect their own in-
terests. This effort was supported by the Dutch people, press,
politicians, and a number of high-ranking officers. The union,
which is run by seven draftees, has a membership of fifty per
cent of the 45,000 conscripts within the Dutch armed forces.
The method of bargaining used by the V.V.D.M. is termed insti-
tutionalized consultation, which is defined as organized dis-
cussion between government representatives and armed forces
personnel on matters of mutual concern prior to any governmental
decision implementation in the field of military personnel.
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Armed forces elected representatives are sent to
a monthly committee meeting where personnel matters are openly
discussed and considered by Defense Ministry officials.
The consultation has the following accomplishments
to its credit:
* Establishment of new billeting (housing) standards, in-
cluding modernization of barracks and mess halls.
* Allowance for the wearing of civilian clothes when
off duty.
* Abolishment of so-called military trains which were
mandatory for off-duty travel previously.
* Abolishment of close detention, length of hair, and
the number of inspections.
* Introduction of free reveille procedures.
* An increase in pay to the level of the minimum youth
wages for a person of 20 years of age.
Like the Swedish union, the Dutch also are not al-
lowed to strike. Compared to other NATO soldiers, the Dutch
soldier may appear to be slovenly in appearance, but his com-
petence and dedication are unquestionable.
c. The Federal Republic of Germany: A Quasi-Union
Military personnel in West Germany are represented
by the German Armed Forces Association (DBVB) . The DBVB is
much like a professional association, since military unions
are not permitted. Members of the association elect repre-
sentatives who lobby within the Defense Ministry and the West
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German legislature for favorable legislation concerning service
conditions, pay and allowances.
The West German system represents a compromise be-
tween Sweden's genuine collective bargaining union and the in-
stitutionalized consultation procedures of the Dutch. The
German soldier not only has the DBVB, but he can also belong to
a non-military trade union.
One of the popular unions joined by military per-
sonnel is the Transport and Traffic Trade Union (OTV) . This
union consists mainly of public employees who negotiate annually
with the Federal Minister of Interior for better conditions.
Since civilian and military salaries are derived from the same
schedule, benefits gained by the OTV assist the military, also the
military supplements the OTV by the lobby pressures applied by
the DBVB.
"The Federal Republic's mixed military association
labor union works well and compromises neither discipline nor
preparedness." [Defense Manpower Commission: Organizing the
Military Services Into a Union, 1975. p. 10.]
Discontent in the U.S. armed forces is a result of
the peacetime environment and the economic situation, which
have tended to erode benefits programs considered part of the
serviceman's contract.
In order to try and reduce the high percentage of the
budget allocated to personnel, "scuttlebutt" about reduced pen-
sions, phasing out of subsidies for the operating costs of
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commissaries over a three-year period, reduced family health
care (CHAMPUS) , and restraint in the growth of compensation
levels, all become extremely important to the soldier and his
family.
This, together with the staunch opposition directed
towards unionization by political and military leaders, is in
the author's opinion only creating a situation in which unioni-
zation of the armed forces will flourish.
A fundamental premise of military service is that
the military commander bears the ultimate responsibility for
his men. He must be given the maximum discretion to accomplish
his mission. This premise must not be overridden if unions are
allowed into the U. S. services. The authority of the military
commander remains paramount in the three alternatives outlined,
and the same authority must exist if effective unionization is
to occur in the U. S. forces.
The next step for unionization within the U.S. forces
is for political and military leaders to face the situation real-
istically, accept that unionization will eventually succeed, and
plan so that the successful union is designed in accordance
with DoD requirements.
The advantages and disadvantages of military unioni-
zation have been left for the reader to judge for himself. One
area yet to be researched is if military unions become opera-
tional what would be their effect on recruiting? Young men
considering a service career may often be put off from joining
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because of the impersonal nature of the military system. This
perception could change if he knew at least a union existed to
which he could take his troubles.
This section on democratization of the service has
been an attempt on the author ' s part to cover the number of
different types of alternatives available to defense planners,
so that they may design a method acceptable to society, so that
the individualistic nature of soldiers are taken into account.
D. SPECIALIST SYNDROME
Society is increasingly complex. Therefore, people must in-
creasingly specialize to serve society much the same way nations
specialize and participate in international trade. Today's
armed forces, because of technology changes, have a requirement
for an increasing number of specialists. Yet in most services
officers are essentially generalists. The system is not dis-
similar to that of the old landed gentry, when the young sons were
instructed to be gentlemen first, and then, how to make a living.
Today graduating officers from all the various commissioning
agencies are told you must be an officer and gentleman first,
and then, and only then, can you specialize in say transport,
flying or supply.
A young man studies in college and in many cases at the
various military academies to be a physicist, an economist, and
so forth. The services then send him out to work in an unre-
lated field, surely an inefficient method of manpower utilization.
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A man should be known as an "electrical engineer" first
then as an "officer." Such a procedure would provide links
between professional groups. Prestige accruing to the individual
as an electrical engineer officer may indirectly enhance the
prestige of the military, and the military in general would
have stronger links with a wider range of civilian profes-
sional groups. A continual update of technology in the profes-
sional field would flow into the military at little cost. [Ros-
ser, 1973.]
Morris Janowitz [1972] , in recommending changes needed for
the transition to the all-volunteer force, noted a similar need.
He proposed that the three-step system of in-service professional
schools be consolidated. The continuation of the current system
he deemed to be "wasteful, often mechanical and repetitious, as
well as time-consuming." He does not deny that military officers
require extensive education, but perhaps a two-tier system would
suffice?
Janowitz also recommends that the military academy programs
should permit one year attendance at a civilian university, al-
though his reasoning for so doing is not stated. Such a proce-
dure would provide a benefit that the draft provided, that is it
would help discourage a separate military ethos which could con-
stitute a political threat. Exposure to the freedom and ideals




E. THE HAIRCUT ANACHRONISM
It may seem like a trite issue, but to enlisted military
personnel the standards of haircuts are a big issue of pro-
test. Society has accepted the new standards, so why not the
military?
Congressman Edward Hebert, Chairman of the House of Repre-
sentatives Armed Services Committee, suggests that any relaxa-
tion of restrictions in the military about haircuts is tending
to turn the armed forces into a permissive and democratic
country club. [Rosser, 1973.]
It must be agreed that for certain jobs, restrictions on
hair length must apply for health or safety reasons, just as it
does within the civilian community.
It is about time the services considered Admiral Zumwalt's
remarks:
"
. . .1 have yet to be shown how neatly trimmed beards
and sideburns or neatly shaped afro haircuts contribute to
military delinquency, or detract from a ship's ability
to carry out its combat function."
[Mulliken, 1970. p. 21.]
There are a number of convincing testimonies supporting
Zumwalt from women and from European soldiers, who are allowed




F. ATTITUDES TO SERVICE INCENTIVES
The services have a requirement to develop better admini-
strative techniques to foster the appeal of a service career
by competent personnel. The choice of a strategy by which to
influence career motivation within the services has assumed
increasing importance in the all-volunteer environment. Despite
the urgent need, however, the optimum strategy is not immediately
apparent.
1. Incentives as a Change Mechanism
The logic of incentives as a change mechanism starts with
the simple paradigm that if you offer people the opportunity to
gain specific objects or objectives which they value, they will
change their behavior in order to realize these values and then
adjust their behavior in order to maintain these values. In
using this approach, however, the implicit assumptions outlined
in the following paragraphs have often been overlooked. Yet,
they are crucial in both the design and utilization of incen-
tive change methods.
An important assumption underlying the incentive inter-
vention approach is that "more is better" such that when greater
societal value is attached to particular incentives, such in-
centives are assumed to be more effective. The manpower pro-
jections developed by the Gates Commission assumed this to be
true. In the Commission Report, it was estimated that a 10%
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increase in basic military pay would result in a 12.5% increase
in the enlistment rate, while a 4 0% pay raise would bring about
a 49% increase in the number of voluntary enlistees. [Presi-
dent's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 197 0.]
Another assumption is that the incentives which are
being manipulated actually represent appreciable values and con-
stitute a source of attraction to the target population in-
volved. To the extent that they are not obviously, the ap-
proach loses effectiveness. Clearly the services, with their
great diversity of individuals with a wide variety of needs
and motives, presents a problem in trying to use any single
incentive strategy effectively.
Much in the same way unions have little opposition to
young men joining a union on starting their first job. Under
the conditions of an all-volunteer service program, the success
of the program depends on the incentives offered by the services
and the perception of these incentives by society. Both the
incentives offered must align to what is wanted.
Frey et. al., [1973] in their extensive research program
into incentives within the Navy, present a number of enlighten-
ing facts.
The purpose of the research was to administer a set of
experimental incentives to a random sample of male youth in the
age ranges 16-22 years in order to ascertain their potential
worth for inducing enlistment into the Navy. One of the ap-
proaches to test if "more is better" was to check whether
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increases in the absolute magnitude of single incentives would
enhance the attractiveness of the Navy.
Differences in the value of an enlistment bonus were
presented since enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses have a
long history of popularity and use. Thus, the attractiveness
of a $1,000 enlistment bonus was compared with the attractive-
ness of a $3/000 enlistment bonus for the same length of engage-
ment period. Surprisingly, contrary to popular opinion, the
$1,000 bonus was marginally more attractive than the $3,000
bonus. The results must tentatively suggest that "more is some-
times worse." [Frey et. al., 1973.]
Although one may at first feel that the above results
are contrary to common sense a number of psychological theories
provide possible explanations.
Increasing the absolute magnitude of certain incentives
may lead one to the conclusion that the Navy is so unattractive
that it must resort to bribes to ensure enlistment.
The dominant philosophy of motivation currently used by
service managers is the carrot-and-stick philosophy, reward and
punishment. If one were to ask these same managers to close
their eyes for a moment and to form a picture in their mind of
an image with a carrot at one end and a stick at the other, then
ask them to describe the central image in that picture, most
frequently they would respond that the central figure was a
jackass. Thus the unconscious assumption behind the reward-
punishment model is that one is dealing with jackasses. Today's
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youth are far from being jackasses, they realize there is no
such thing as a "free lunch." [Levinson, 1973.]
A second possible explanation is that these increased
incentives may be perceived as grossly manipulative. If this were
the case, their feelings could harbor resentment, and thus pre-
vent a person from enlisting.
2. Is Money The Answer ?
Money is supposed to be the main reason, if not the only
one, that most people have for working at all . Gellerman states:
"To be effective the net gain must be large enough to
assure the individual of some degree of safety. Pre-
cisely because an increment has to be big to be effective,
it is likely to encounter skepticism."
[Gellerman, 1968. p. 278.]
The Gates Commission recommended pay raise was large
and pay for military recruits increased 193 per cent above in-
flation between 1964 and 1973, however their recommendation suf-
fered from two other money misconceptions. [Towell, 1977.]
Firstly, managers think money is a prime motivator because
they themselves are highly achievement-oriented and attach spe-
cial significance to money rewards. Military men and top execu-
tives tend to be achievement-oriented and because they them-
selves are particularly interested in some concrete measure that
will reflect how well they have done, it is easy and natural for
them that the same will apply for all. [McClelland, 1967.]
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Secondly, managers have a tendency to keep coming
back to money as a means of motivating people because at the
practical level it is one thing that can be easily manipulated.
From the above, if money is not the prime motivator for
enlistment into the services, what is?
In 1969 Bachman and Johnston asked 2,213 male respon-
dents how attractive they would find each of 11 different in-
centives assuming that the Vietnam War had ended and the draft
had been eliminated. One incentive stood out above the others:
the Government agrees to pay for up to four years college in
return for four years active duty. This alternative was
chosen by a four to one majority. In 197 the same questions
were asked of a sample of 1,273 with the same 25 per cent ma-
jority. [Bachman and Johnston, 1972.]
During the period April 1971 to April 1972, a question-
naire was administered to all male enlistees at twenty-five
Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations. The total sample
consisted of 26,853 voluntary accessions to the enlisted force.
The first twelve questions requested respondents to rank each
of twelve reasons that may have influenced them to join the
services on a scale of either strong influence, some influence
or no influence. The most frequently endorsed reason for en-
listment was to learn a trade or skill valuable in civilian life.
Between 59% and 65% of the total sample attributed strong influ-
ence to this reason in each month. [Fisher and Harford, 1973.]
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The above research programs have indicated that money is
not the main motivator of persons intending to join the armed
services. If this then is the case, what action should the
Government now take?
During May 1973, a nationwide sample of youth, ages 14
to 22, were stratified within geographic region according to age
and school status. A sample of 860 males aged between 16 - 22
were requested to assess a set of experimental incentives in
order to ascertain their potential fruitfulness for inducing
enlistment in the Navy. An effort was made in the assessment
to compare the potential effectiveness of these incentives when they
were presented individually and when presented in combination with
each other. In December 1973, the five most attractive incentives
from the above experiment with ten new incentives were adminis-
tered to a national sample of 854 civilian males aged 16 - 22
years. The consistency of results from both iterations enabled
the following conclusions:
1. Increasing the number of different enlistment incentives
does not increase the attraction of a career — double or
even triple incentives packages are no better than single
incentives.
2. A tangible incentive has a critical point beyond which in-
creasing its absolute value has no effect. In some cases
an increase in absolute value of a tangible incentive may
even decrease the attraction of enlistment.
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3. Different incentives attract different demographic groups.
4. The opportunity to exercise a greater degree of fate con-
trol in one's vocation represents an influence that is
equal to or stronger than the appeal of traditional tangi-
ble incentives.
Recruiting strategies based primarily upon the "economic man"
model must be considered highly suspect. The Government needs
to pursue the above experiments in order to obtain an optimum
incentive strategy. [American Institute for Research, 1974.]
Enlistment in today's volunteer armed services connotates
a controlled environment. Members enlisting perceive that their
fate is controlled by the powers to be. The services have taken
it for granted that the exigencies of military service leave lit-
tle room for modification of current organizational practices to
alter the image in terms of more flexible decision-making
initiative-taking and individual participation. Serious consi-
deration must be given to experimenting with organizational changes
that provide a psychological climate that offers men a larger
measure of personal fate control in their vocational life.
Civilians while working have the option of giving "no-
tice" and then leaving. This too may ensure that they have a
certain amount of freedom. It disperses the fear of a controlled
environment. It is recommended that the services research the
implications of having a three-month trial enlistment, after
which time the individual is free to seek employment elsewhere.
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Immediate reaction to such a proposal is that it would
be too costly. To counter this argument, one can quote "quality
is superior to quantity." Also, the military tends to oppose
experimentation. It wants complete commitment, or nothing.
With the appropriate safeguards to protect its interests,
there does not seem to be any way the services could lose, em-
ploying such a scheme.
Initial enlistment would probably increase, as it would
appear much easier to make a small decision (three months) rather
than a long-term one (three to six years) . To a young man, six
years appears to be the rest of his youth.
Today patriotism, compulsion, financial benefits, job
training opportunities, and the promise of adventure are no lon-
ger successful in motivating young men to enlist, re-enlist,
fight, and risk their lives in the armed forces.
Military managers must locate and develop those tradi-
tional incentives to which the youth of today are still respon-
sive, yet also give serious consideration to developing new in-
centives which provide a psychological climate that offers
service members a larger measure of control over their vocation.
G. FORCE EFFECTIVENESS
It is important that when considering all the alternatives
offered in this chapter that one does not lose sight of the fact
that the armed forces have a vital mission and that any changes
adopted must not impinge upon their operational effectiveness.
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It is the author's contention that none of the changes high-
lighted would lessen operational effectiveness.
The military can proceed using its old methods, but without
change there must be doubt as to whether it can develop an ef-
fective military force/ that is compatible with the rest of
American society. A military force that is unlike the society
it serves is not effective. The Vietnam conflict brought home
this expensive lesson.
The following quote provides a fitting closure to this
chapter
:
"The coming generation of military leaders therefore
should examine objectively the issues with respect to
the relationship of the military to society, and discard
dogma which cannot withstand the test of operational
effectiveness. The military has been spared this task
for 20 years because of the cold war and a resulting
manpower draft. But the luxury of a guaranteed supply
of men and a sympathetic public has about run its course."
[Rosser, 1973. p. 175.]
The U. S. military has accepted the social pressures and
instituted an all-volunteer armed force, yet they must maintain
a force size comparable with national security and foreign
policy missions. The current system is failing to provide the
necessary recruits. Is this "checkmate?" A system which may




V. THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM
The British Army currently operates on a regimental system
of organization, as does the Australian Army. The success of
the regimental system in Australia is limited; this is not the
fault of the system, but rather the fact that the Australian
Army has too few persons to gain the full benefits of such an
organizational structure.
The regimental system has been applied only to armies;
however, such a concept can be adopted for the Navy or an Air
Force. For the Navy, a home port or fleet concept could apply,
while a home base could be used as an Air Force equivalent.
A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The term regiment has been defined in Webster's dictionary
as "a body of soldiers commanded by a colonel and consisting of
a number of companies, troops, or batteries." The term appears
throughout history in almost every army of the world.
It is important to realize that the term is used in a dif-
ferent sense from that which is often used in the U. S. Army.
The British regiment is not a combat unit. The term regiment
refers to a group of associated infantry battalions with a
common title, common interests, and in many cases recruited
from the same geographical area. The U. S. regiment is a com-
bat unit composed of three battalions and supporting arms. The
British equivalent to this U. S. regiment is a "brigade," while
the Australian equivalent is a "task force."
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The regiment was never designed to be a tactical unit, it
evolved for purposes of administration, discipline, and instruc-
tions for a number of subordinate units. Its formation provided
its member units with a central supply system as well as a replace-
ment depot system that would permit subordinate units to maneuver
and fight more effectively. [Mayew, 197 6.]
Each regiment consists of a number of fighting battalions.
Historically, in peacetime a British army regiment normally had
two battalions, one at home and one overseas. When mobilization
occurred, the number of battalions were greatly increased.
All the affairs of the regiment are run by the Depot and
Regimental Headquarters. This co-ordinating unit is commanded
by a lieutenant colonel and he is responsible purely for regi-
mental matters, such as recruiting, induction, demobilization,
individual and regimental records, regimental customs and pro-
cedures. [Paget, 1954.]
Each regiment has a "Colonel of the Regiment." He is nor-
mally the senior retired officer of the regiment and is given
this honorary title together with the responsibility of watching
over the regiment's interests. He represents the regiment at
official and unofficial occasions, lays down the policy on all
domestic matters, as well as selecting candidates for commissions.
In the U.S., patriotism, compulsion, financial benefits, and
the promise of adventure have been the motivations emphasized in
encouraging recruits into the armed forces. However, in the
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Roman Legions heavy reliance was placed upon the motivation
of unit pride, membership or esprit de corps. It is this
heavy reliance upon morale that provides the base for the
British regiment.
An officer or soldier in the British Army can serve through-
out his military career belonging to the same regiment. Even
if for career necessity the soldier has to go to other duties
or units, he still remains part of the regiment and will re-
turn to the regiment after the necessary assignments.
By using this technique the regiment creates a group small
enough for loyalties and traditions to be built up to an extent
which is impossible in larger and more impersonal units. Each
regiment has a name, a standard, distinguishing badges, special
customs, rituals and traditions, together with a long and
honorable history.
B. HISTORY OF THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM
The precise date of the organization of the first regiment is
difficult to determine. British historians claim the first date
as being 1421, when the Scotsmen-at-arms entered the service of
France as archers. Germany claims 1478 with the establishment
of their mercenary bands. Although it is difficult to establish
the first date, by the end of the thirteenth century six dif-
ferent countries, France, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Sweden,




Until the 19th century Britain's Army was not a full-time
army organization, but rather an organization of separate regi-
ments. During war the battalions were brought together to form
tactical units called brigades. Each regiment was self support-
ing, providing arms and ammunition while the soldier provided
all the other essentials such as uniforms and clothing.
The regimental system over this time period tended to be
corrupt. However, it was basically a good system for its time;
it provided little cost to the country. The system was tested
and forged by frequent wars. It was a system that people knew,
it was capable of operating for regulars or militia, and it was
a system supported by more than a century of military history
and tradition.
It is because of this strong tradition that the British
regimental system has survived with little modification to the
present day.
1 . Use of the Regiment in America
The first day of the landings at Jamestown in 1607 the
settlers accepted a militia obligation. By 1623 it became a
statutory requirement to bear arms and muster for military duty
when called.
"In 1636 the General Court of Massachusetts Bay organ-
ized Massachusetts companies into the colonies first regiments,
the North, East, and Boston regiments." [Mayew, 197 6. p. 15.]
April 17 56 saw Major General Edward Braddock appointed
as Commander-in-Chief of all the military forces in North
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America. His two Irish Infantry regiments were joined by two
locally recruited regiments in June of the same year. By fall
1756, a new regiment designated the Royal Americans, or the 60th
Regiment, joined the other four regiments. [Weigley, 1967.] This
system of local recruiting for British Regiments soon ceased and
the British forces were reinforced direct from England.
On June 30, 177 5, the Continental Congress adopted, with
a few modifications, the British Articles of War for governing
the initial authorization of troops. The American Army of 1775
had thirty-eight regiments. [Mayew, 197 6.] General Washington
organized these regiments into brigades of six regiments each,
with two brigades forming a division.
Continental regiments received their support entirely
from their home states. Each state determined the equipment
for its regiments, thus each regiment had a different size and
different standards of equipment and training.
In 1784, Congress reorganized the Army into a single
regiment of approximately 700 men, their mission being to pro-
vide troops to man the former British frontier garrisons. Con-
gress provided each State a quota of manpower requirements.
The deterioration of Indian relations necessitated a
reorganization of the Army into the Legions of the United States
in 1792. This reorganization saw an increase in authorized
strength to 774 officers and 9,147 enlisted men. [Mayew, 1976.]
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After the war of 1812, the Army underwent a further
reorganization. These continual reorganizations provided no
chance for lineage to be established or continued. What few
traditions and esprit de corps the regiments did have was lost
in the maze of so numerous reorganizations.
18 21 saw the reduction of the regular army to 5,586
enlisted men. This force retained its regimental structure
during the successful Mexican War up to the Civil War.
The organization of the army for the Civil War included
nineteen regiments of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, and
five regiments of artillery, with a maximum strength of 44,8 93
officers and men. [Mayew, 1976.] However, the tactical de-
ployment of regiments as regiments was incorrect as the regiments
were too large.
During the course of the Civil War, the Northern Army
organized approximately 1,7 00 infantry regiments, 27 2 cavalry
regiments, and 78 regiments of artillery. The Confederacy or-
ganized approximately 572 infantry regiments, 150 regiments of
cavalry and 3 00 batteries of artillery. [Mayew, 197 6.
J
The years 1869 to 1950 saw a number of reorganizations.
This period saw the beginning of the end of the regiments as
part of the army structure. The experiences of the Spanish Am-
erican War made it apparent that the best organization for an




On June 3, 1916, Congress approved the National Defense
Act, which provided for the establishment of tactical divisions
in a peacetime environment. This, together with the replace-
ment method of man for man used by the American Expeditionary
Forces in World War I, provided for little regimental continuity.
World War II saw the return of the regimental struc-
ture especially for specialized soldiers such as mountain
troops. The regimental structure in 1956 was limited to fifty-
four infantry regiments and four armored cavalry regiments on
active duty.
The pentomic organization evolved in the mid-1950' s.
This organization was based on five subordinate units with a
nuclear capability. This new organization eliminated any
semblance of the old three regimental structure and regimental
commands.
The introduction of the Combat Arms Regimental System
(CARS) in 1957 saw an attempt by the army to retain the his-
tories and traditions of all its regiments. CARS has had minor
success in perpetuating the honors and histories of the various
regiments, but the fifth phase, to provide a home for the regi-
mental headquarters and a home for all members of the various
regiments, has yet to be implemented. Until phase five of CARS
has been implemented, benefits associated with a regimental
system based on the British concept will not be forthcoming
to the American forces.
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The 1964 army reorganization under Reorganization
Objective Army Division (ROAD) eliminated all but five ar-
mored cavalry regiments from the active army organization.
A review of the general history of the regimental
concept and its role in the U. S. Army is essential to show
that such an organization structure is not nev; to the United
States. But the full benefits to be gained from such a sys-
tem, lineage and esprit de corps has been hampered by reorgani-
zations legislation.
"Some sinister effort must have been at work to de-
prive all the old regiments of their traditions and
spirit. For no plan could have more shrewdly damned
any existing pride and affiliations than the way the
Army was diabolically jumbled."
[Ganoe, 1964. p. 32.]
This quote from Major Ganoe ' s "the History of the
United States Army" dealing with the 1815 reorganization,
indicates the reason for the lack of tradition associated
with U. S. forces when compared to British forces.
C. WHY THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM?
1. Esprit De Corps
Pride and loyalty in one's unit is a very real asset,
especially in time of war. During the Korean War, the death
rate among allied prisoners of war due to sickness and mal-
nutrition was remarkably low among the British prisoners.
"Doctors attributed this largely to the regimental system, be-
cause it built up a unit pride and loyalty among the men."
[Paget, 1954. p. 32.] Men from the same regiments helped
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members of their regiment who were in trouble. Morale and the
determination to live were raised as these men were determined
not to let the regiment down by displaying weak or dishonorable
behavior.
Military effectiveness is strongly influenced by
leadership, but in the last analysis effectiveness depends
on the fighting spirit of the individual servcieman. One of
the most important elements that contributes to this fighting
spirit is esprit de corps or unit pride. Major General Blakeley
writing in 1955 quotes a National Guard general as saying: "We
will never win the next war with those faceless things that GIs
call 'bodies' - we must have units that know their traditions
and will die for them." It is agreed Vietnam was not a declared
war, but the quote is worthy of note, when one considers the
Vietnam experience.
Is tradition or esprit de corps worth anything to a
unit? Some officers will contend that without exprit de corps
the combat unit is of little value, while others will disagree.
Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett, USA, Retired, who has com-
manded both a regiment and a combat command, notes that a unit
with a long record of achievements is worth twenty-five per
cent more than one with no tradition. Since it is difficult to
measure the worth of tradition to a unit, it is not possible to
say a unit will win battles by five or ten per cent. If it can
help, is it not worthwhile? [Fisher, 1955.]
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Adoption of the regimental system based on the advan-
tage of an esprit de corps of such a system people may claim
is obsolete in the twentieth century. Contemporary man is too
skeptical, rational, to be influenced by a system based on tra-
dition. One may argue against this, the continued success of
the regimental system of the British Army, not to mention the
very high morale of elite units in the United States, such as
the "Green Berets." The return of an esprit de corps must be con-
sidered a major advantage to the introduction of a regimental
«
system to the U, S. military.
The knowledge of belonging to a regiment gives a per-
son a sense of security among the many uncertainties of military
life. The soldier needs to feel that he is a member of a fami-
ly. This feeling is especially true in time of peace due to the
lack of national interest in the armed forces. It is also
especially true if the individual happens to join the service
from a broken home.
The need to affiliate, or to be with others, is an
exceedingly strong one in some individuals. Schachter once
placed five students in five separate rooms in which they had
no contact with the outside world. Each of the volunteer stu-
dents was ^given a considerable sum of money for each day they
remained in the sterile environment. By the second day, only
one student remained; he lasted until the eighth day. Although
not a well-controlled experiment, it does indicate the need for
affiliation and the effects of social isolation. [Wrightsman,
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Once recruited direct into a regiment, the member
soon knows that he can always turn to his regiment for help,
and that he is always known there personally, and that he is
important to the regiment. This sense of belonging provides
other advantages:
1. The soldier is made conscious of his being part of a
community which has certain standards. The community
has a reputation to uphold. The community also has a
life which will survive the life of any of its members.
2. The recognition of being part of a community puts social
pressure on the soldier to want to conform to its standards,
rather than pure discipline and or relatively abstract
patriotism.
3. The existence of the unit as a community, and because of
slow turnover its members establish long friendships. Every-
one knows everyone well; strengths and weaknesses of each
individual are known and they may be employed for the bene-
fit of the whole. This is especially useful to commanders
in the field as they know their men and thus are not in the
hands of computer printouts.
4. Soldiers will develop strong links and ties with the com-
munity, thus making his early resignation all the more
difficult.
Thus, in terms of a volunteer military, the regimental
system is particularly attractive, because it offers the member





The regimental system makes it possible to decentralize
some of the administration of individuals and his welfare. In
so doing this then develops a more personal contact than when
careers are handled centrally.
Recommendations for promotions are made from within the
regiment, hence these recommendations are based on personal
knowledge, and as such must be considered superior to that
which may be contained in records and reports.
Recruiting for each regiment could be geographically
based. Each regiment would be responsible for its own training
standards. This being the case, the regiments would have flex-
ibility in establishing their own recruiting standards. Each
regiment would know the jobs that were vacant, the urgency
required in filling the positions and the minimum standard re-
quired to occupy the position. Thus a regimental commander may
be willing to accept a lower standard in order to ensure that
a necessary task is performed. The current system of centralized
recruiting procedures allows no flexibility of standards.
3 Cost Center Utilization
With the amount of money allocated each year for de-
fense becoming smaller in relation to the whole, then it be-
comes the responsibility of the military forces to ensure that
the resource is not wasted. A system for measuring commander's
efficiency, while at the same time ensuring maximum budgetary
control is to employ each regiment as a cost center. Each
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regiment could be given a recruiting and training budget. The
standard of the regiment must be maintained at a certain mini-
mum acceptable level. Regimental commanders achieving these
standards at least cost should be recognized.
Utilization of a regiment as a defined cost center has
certain attractive benefits and should lead to lower costs,
especially in manpower procurement in the future.
4. "Up or Out "
Policies such as "up or out" must be re-examined by
military planners. The present system of promotion and re-
wards places premium on calendar methods instead of proven
human performance and capabilities. Members not wanting su-
pervisory roles are forced out, even though they may be com-
petent technicians. It must be acknowledged that not all
members joining the forces will reach the pinnacle of success,
i.e. general or admiral. It is also recognized that the Peter
Principle generally prevails in the military environment, that
is, man raises to the level of his incompetence. Since not
everyone can be a general, why dismiss those persons who have
accepted their level of competence.
Currently the armed forces incur substantial costs as
a result of the inadequacy of information available about the
value of its human resources. During the past few years, human
resources accounting has become prominent. Human resource ac-
counting involves measuring the costs incurred by an organization
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to recruit, select, hire, train, and develop human assets. It
also involves measuring the economic value of people to the
services. In an unpublished paper, Bill Carter attempts to
value the Navy pilot by using training costs incurred as a
surrogate measure. By establishing an individual's future worth
to the organization, an estimated loss of $307,421 (1976 prices)
must be written off by the Navy if they fail to promote the
pilot after his eleventh year of a planned twenty-five year
career. After eleven years service and after being passed over
for promotion, the pilot has little alternative but to retire.
With individual worth established in dollar terms, the "up or
out" philosophy must be challenged. [Carter, 1977.]
A regimental system would have the advantage that it
would be able to employ those persons in certain positions for
as long as the person was contented to remain depending on age
restrictions
.
5. Reserve Military Forces
A strong reserve force is crucial to the success of
an all-volunteer force. In early February 1977, the Army
Chief of Staff, General Bernard Rogers, warned the Armed Services
Committee of the plight of the reserves. The reserves are ex-
periencing a serious decline in strength due to the lack of
draft-motivated enlistments. [Towell, 1977.]
If a regimental structured force was established in an
area, it could consist of both regular and reserve forces. Thus,
an intimate liaison is set up increasing the efficiency of both,
in peace and war. Both forces can train together; this is
101

especially beneficial to the reserves as they get to use and
train on the latest weapons. They can not under the current
system.
A little rivalry properly controlled between active
and reserve forces is a great incentive to achievement in
peace as well as in war. The regimental system encourages
just this competitive spirit. A true example of this spirit
comes from the famous charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava
during the Crimean War. A blunder in orders caused 8 00 British
cavalry to charge the Russian guns., A charge which meant al-
most certain death. "As they raced at a gallop into the Valley
of Death, a trooper of the 13th Light Dragoons was heard to shout,
"Come on, Don't let those - - - of the Seventeenth [Lancers]
get in front of us." [Paget, 1954, p. 32.] On the other hand,
extreme competition whereby regiments act only in their own
interest and not in the common interest of the service could
jeopardize missions.
A combination of reserve and active units in the one
location may supply the needed incentive to increase reserve
recruitment. The reserve force will be able to identify and
train with active duty forces thus dispelling the notion that
they are merely "weekend warriors playing soldiers."
6 . Command and Control
The regimental concept of organization, where a num-
ber of battalions are grouped under a regimental headquarters,




The first is responsibility. Man will continue to be an
important factor in war, whether it be nuclear, conventional,
or guerrilla. Hence, his behavior and the means of controlling
his actions are not to be treated lightly. The battalion com-
mander within a regimental organization is always responsible,
directly to the regimental commander for all his actions, whether
operating as a regimental unit or attached to another unit. Such
a close chain of responsibility is not to be found within the
combat command structure. Because a battalion can move from
one combat command to another, and if the battalion is not per-
forming up to standard, there is a tendency for the combat com-
mand commander to tolerate such performance, since the battalion
is not an organic portion of his command. In this case, the
combat commander may be tempted to blame battle failure on the fact
that he was not responsible for the training of the battalions as-
signed to him.
The regimental commander, on the other hand, can and ex-
pects to be held responsible at all times for the behavior of
all his units, whether they be attached or organic to the regi-
ment. Even when operating detached from their own regiment, the
battalion commander will continue to work hard to impress his
own regimental commander. [Fisher, 1955.]
The principle of span of control should probably be con-
sidered with responsibility. It is agreed that there is a limit
to the number of subordinates which anyone person can effectively
supervise and control. The exact number is different depending
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on the situation. The control span ranges from five to about
seven subordinates. The combat command concept with the large
number of subordinates reporting directly to the division commander
violates this principle. The regimental commander on the other
hand has the advantage in assisting the division commander in
his responsibilities on a continuous basis.
7 . Rotation Policy
The current U. S. world-wide personnel system which
leads to continuous, excessive, expensive, and disruptive rota-
tion can no longer be justified in today's environment. The
rationale for this antiquated system is that it prevents stag-
nation and trains personnel for high command. Training would
be the responsibility of the regimental commander and a unit
replacement system would be used rather than individual replace-
ment. Individual replacement has become outmoded, because it
weakens military cohesion. Individual replacement causes
family discontent which leads to resignations and failure to
re-enlist.
Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of "The New York
Times," summed up the rotational situation this way in a
"Saturday Evening Post" article:
"Today, rotation and turnover, and the Army's replace-
ment system have made the fine old regiments - Custer's
7th Cavalry ... the 38th [Infantry], the 9th, and the
rest - merely numbers on the roster; not living, breath-
ing parts of a continuing tradition.
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"The services must at all costs build up unit esprit
de corps ... A Service "home", less rotation/ less career
guidance , less emphasis on individual schooling and train-
ing, more unit integrity and cohesiveness - these are the
needs.
"
[Blakely, 1955. p. 3.]
If a regimental organization structure was developed for
the U. S. services, it would require that the regiment would
have an established "home base" from which all rotational tours
would begin and to which the regiment would return. Such a sys-
tem would benefit the soldier, his family, and the general
society.
The soldier would know where to buy a house, his family
can integrate with the local community, join various clubs, etc.
If the regiment moves overseas, then his family has the support
and friendship of other regimental families as well as the local
community.
The local community tends to adopt- a regiment which is
located in their area. They claim the regiment as their own
and feel as proud of it as the men who are in it. Thus local
civilians do their share towards helping the regiment, they do
not want to let down their local regiment. During war, the col-
lection of "home comforts" to be sent to their regiment is much
easier to collect for than for the services as a whole.
Thus there is a need by military planners to investigate
and appraise the regimental system and its possible adoption
for the U. S. military forces. There are of course drawbacks
to the regimental system.
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D. DISADVANTAGES TO THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM
The major disadvantage to the employment of a regimental
system is that it complicates personnel procedures. The army
loses flexibility as it foregoes the ability to transfer at
will personnel required to meet the needs of the entire army.
It also becomes very difficult to correct poor management at
higher levels. The ability to transfer top managers, who are
not members of the regiment into a regiment is difficult.
One disadvantage which is sometimes cited against the regi-
mental system is that unit emphasis would lead to an uneven
quality of units. This is probably correct, although the in-
stitution of service-wide requirements of training and performance
for all units could be used to minimize this effect.
It is argued that a regimental system with its regimental
headquarters, badges, and ceremonial appurtenance necessary to
create a unit identity is expensive. These costs, however, are
likely to be small in comparison to the savings in rotation
expenses. Any necessary collective facilities such as officers'
and NCO ' s messes could be paid for by the regiments from their own
pockets, as such facilities would be permanent. Under the cur-
rent system transients are not motivated to invest in permanent
facilities for which they will gain little benefit.
Another disadvantage cited is that the regimental system
increases the risk of one particular area suffering unduly if
its units have heavy casualties. This possibility can not be
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denied, but the risk can be minimized if units are not too large
Also all units are not likely to be in battle together. In any
case, the risk should be accepted as one of the inevitable risks
of war. The nuclear weapons of today place whole cities under
the same danger.
With the advantages outweighing the above disadvantages,
how would a proposed regimental system be implemented into the
existing U. S. armed forces?
E. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM
The British regimental system is partly organized on a
geographical basis with the counties often having their own
regiments of one or more battalions named after them. Each
regiment consists of at least one or two active duty battalions,
together with one or two reserve battalions. On war being de-
clared, the reserves are mobilized from within the various
regiments.
The tremendous state pride that exists within the United
States provides a ready base for the adoption of the regimental
system along British lines. At many of the established military
bases a regimental headquarters could be established. The
tactical organization that currently exists could remain and be
allocated to a regimental headquarters. Reserve units could
also be allocated to a regimental headquarters.
The United States could then be divided into numerous re-
cruiting areas. Each regiment would be assigned one of these
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recruiting areas. Regiments would recruit exclusively from
this area, using their own staff and resources. However, there
is a need to ensure that recruiting does not solely become based
upon provincial boundaries. If the number of recruits in an area
exceeds the capacity of the units, a waiting list could be main-
tained. Prospective recruits would have a choice of either to
wait for a vacancy in that regiment or join another unit which
would accept him immediately. Just because regiments have cer-
tain defined recruiting areas, it is not suggested that every-
one who lives in that given area is restricted to enlisting in
that regiment. The training of each regiment and its new re-
cruits would be the responsibility of the regiment. Specialized
training at appropriate schools would remain the responsibility
of the current system, except that nominations for attendance
would come from the various regiments.
With recruiting being restricted to a general location, a
need exists for a monitoring system to ensure that each regi-
ment maintains a socio-demographic mix, in agreement with that
of the area.
The result of a reorganization would see the establishment
of the regimental headquarters, an actual home battalion, a re-
serve battalion, a central recruiting station, and a training
center co-located. The number of battalions can be variable,
but each regiment would have a rotational system whereby
battalions would serve overseas.
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Over-all a good case can be made for the adoption of a re-
gimental system, based on military efficiency particularly the
esprit de corps which results from such a system. The system is
particularly attractive in terms of volunteer armed forces be-
cause it offers the man a life in the forces, rather than just a
career. Regimental members become part of a recognizable and
manageable social unit, rather than a cog in an immense, bureau-
cratic machine. The recruit of a regimental organization is
able to alleviate the fears that he may have of losing control
of his destiny. [National Technical Information Service, 1972.]
Currently the regimental system has only been applied to
armies, however there is no reason why the system could not be
adopted for all elements of the armed forces of a country.
Although the problem of sea-shore rotation is a difficulty for
any naval service.
The British regimental system has worked well in Britain and
a number of her colonies, but perhaps the system is not suitable
for adoption by the American armed forces. Because of social
and cultural backgrounds the successful adoption of a suitable
organization structure in one country does not guarantee a suc-
cessful "transplant" in another environment. "Americans are no-
toriously unhistorical minded and are often oblivious to tra-
ditions and precedents, particularly those elements of society
which are likely to be recruited into a professional army."
[National Technical Information Service, 1972. p. V-5.]
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American society would be reluctant to return to a draft
or a selective service concept. The all-volunteer concept is
expensive and is not attracting recruits as anticipated. The
above discussion on the reigmental system must provide another
alternative which should be investigated as a means of motiva-
ting persons into the volunteer services.
110

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis has been to indicate that
the armed forces of the U. S. are an extension of the society
which they are designed to protect. There is probably a
great deal of truth in the adage that a democracy gets the
military establishment it deserves.
Currently it would appear that the American armed forces
are out of touch with society. Aspects of their structure
and life style are antiquated, the officer and a gentleman
concept dates back to the seventeenth century. Society has
changed radically, the armed forces have adopted few changes.
In order to avoid change the American military has attempted
to pursue an isolation policy. Such a policy causes problems
as the military is unable or unwilling to adjust to the dyna-
mic nature of society.
One may question the assumption that an isolation policy
is not an acceptable policy for the armed forces to pursue.
It is the author's contention that it is essential in a
democratic society for the military to be supported by society,
The United States and France before her both had difficulties
in Vietnam due to the lack of support for their armed forces
by the society remaining at home. It could be noted that all
111

armed forces, regardless of their ideology, require support
from society.
The following quote by Hsiao Hua, General Political De-
partment Director of the Chinese Army, and a member of the
Military Affairs Standing Committee, indicates that even a
communist soldier must reflect his society.
"Since our Army is the army of the people,
it must regularly maintain close relations
with the masses, and nourish itself with
what is acquired from the struggles waged
by the masses. Unless this is done, the
Army will be like a tree that has no root,
a stream whose source has dried up, and
so will its vitality and combat strength."
[Gittings, 1967. p. 176.]
Support of the U. S. armed forces can only be fully
achieved if the society values, trusts, and respects the
armed forces. The process of decline of mass armies and
the Vietnam conflict have indicated that this trust and re-
spect has not been forthcoming.
The three concepts of value, trust, and respect can
only be achieved if the armed forces do not appear to be
an essentially alien organization within the society. The
armed forces must attempt to break away from their bases,
become exposed to civilian universities, and participate
in local civic activities at all levels.
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Because the armed forces have a special role of defense they
must monopolize the nation's major weapon systems and because
of this fact there will always be some degree of alienation be-
tween the armed forces and society. However, the military must
remember that it is up to society, not them, to judge whether
the degree of alienation is excessive. The military may complain
about society becoming decadent, permissive, and immoral. Soci-
ety is dynamic and has the right to diverge from previous norms
of conduct. The military may not accept these new norms, in
which case society has the final judgement. Society voices her
judgement by means of approval of the military budget, and in
whether or not sufficient qualified young men join and remain
in the armed forces. [Rosser, 1973.]
It would appear that military planners in association with
political leaders must adopt a flow procedure to ensure that
current alienation decreases, while at the same time attempt
to predict areas of future change. The procedure contains
seven possible steps, namely:
1. Acknowledgement of the problem.
2. Selection of alternatives available.
3. Selection of the best alternative.
4. Definition of the objective.
5. Allocation of the available resources.
6. Implementation of the program.
7. Updating and program monitoring.
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A. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The purpose of this thesis has been to direct military
planners to the fact that there is a problem in having a society
that is alienated towards the military and if the all-volunteer
system is to be a success then there is need for corrective
action. Once the need for change has been accepted then "half
the battle is over."
B. ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE
An effective military force is vital to U. S. foreign policy.
In order to ensure this effective force there are four possible
alternatives available. First, with a decline in military ca-
pabilities it is possible to merely redefine and narrow the
nation's defense and foreign policy goals. By so doing, it
does not really matter if a degree of alienation between society
and the military exists, because the military is so small. Bri-
tain and Canada have both adopted this alternative over the last
decade. [Rosser, 1973.] The alternative is not feasible for
that of a super power.
A second alternative is for the military to convince so-
ciety that a nav threat to the national security exists. By so
doing, the military is able to increase its size and capabilities
of its forces. Any perceived threat must be based on fact. A
potential enemy must exist and must provide some form of a
threat, which in turn must increase the uncertainty about the
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survival of the nation. This alternative does not appear viable
considering the world political environment and the power which
can be brought to bear on such a policy by the free press.
The third and fourth alternative are both within the power
of the military to effect. The third is that the military can
attempt to maintain its operational effectiveness by isolating
itself from society. That is, accept the traditional military
model as expanded in Chapter III.
Model I, the civilianized military, or Model II, the plu-
ralistic military, as detailed in Chapter III, provide the
other alternatives available to military planners.
C. SELECTION OF THE BEST ALTERNATIVE
Reflecting on the four alternatives, the fourth is considered
the only acceptable, workable alternative to be adopted if the
U. S. armed forces is to alienate itself with the community it
serves.
D. DEFINITION OF THE OBJECTIVE
Since society and the armed forces are not aligned in areas
of value, trust, and respect, there is an urgent need to develop
a program to ensure both elements converge. The military plan-
ners must define an objective which is not only maintainable
but also acceptable to society. If this objective means a
complete re-organization, such as the adoption of the regimental
concept would need, it must be done.
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E. ALLOCATION OF THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES
Congress and the military must be prepared to allocate the
necessary resources required to implement such a program. Since
society has budgetary control, then they should be only too will-
ing to provide the necessary capital. The development of such
a program will require intensive research by military sociologists
This is a problem in itself as sociology of the military encoun-
ters resistance from the more liberal academic disciplines, also
the field has been dominated by a few individuals and it has been
difficult for younger sociologists with new or differing per-
spectives to develop their interests and gain acceptance. [Do-
bratz, 1976.]
Greater effort must be made by the military and academia to
expand and develop the field of sociology of the military.
F. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM
Like any program which envolves change there will be con-
siderable resistance. The planning staff must attempt to re-
duce this resistence by a good implementation procedure. The
planning staff should also be responsible to ensure that the
program monitors the future direction of social values and
changes so that corrective action can be initiated early, so




The thesis has attempted to indicate some of the areas which
need attention; it has also indicated possible solutions. It is
also acknowledged how difficult the proposed change would be for
the military. The coming generation of military leaders should
examine objectively the issues raised and attempt to discard
dogma which cannot be purely supported by operational effective-





1. American Institute for Research, R74-4, Experimental
Incentives as an Influence on Enlistment Intention:
More is not Better , by Frey, R. L. et al. , June 1974.
2. Bacham, G. G. and Johnston, J., "The All-Volunteer Armed
Force: Not Whether But What Kind," Psychology Today
,
v. 6, p. 113-128, October 1972.
3. Blakeley, H. W. , "Esprit De What? Our Army and Morale,"
Military Review , v. 35, pp. 3-7, September 1955.
4. Bliven, B., "All Volunteer Armed Forces," The New Yorker
,
pp. 55-81 and 137-156, 24 November 1975 and 1 December
1975.
5. Bradford, Z. B., and Brown, F. J., The United States Army
in Transition , Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1973.
6. Carter, W. L. , An Example of Human Resource Accounting
,
paper presented at Industrial Psychology, Naval Post-
graduate School, Monterey, CA. , 1 June 1977.
7. Castle, M. J., Women (and Men) in the U. S. Army: A Study
in Optimal Utilization , W. Sc . Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, December 1976.
8. Coates, C. H. , and Pellegrin, R. J., Military Sociology:
A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life
,
The Social Science Press, University Park, MD., 1965.
9. Cortright, D., Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military
Today
, Anchor Press Doubleday, New York, NY, 197 5.
i
10. De Stefano, A., "Is All Well With the Volunteer Military,"
Intellect
, v. 104, pp. 560-562, May-June 1976.
11. Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Key-
stone of National Security , Report to the President and
the Congress, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D. C. , April 1976.
12. Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower Commission
Staff Studies and Supporting Papers , Volumes I - V, U. S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., May 1976.
118

13. Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower Commission:
Organizing the Military Services into a Union , Report to
the President and the Congress, U. S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C, August 1975.
14. DFO, Annual Report 197 6, Report of the Defence Force Om-
budsman for Period 25 December 1975 to 25 November 1976
,
Office of DFO, Government Printer, Canberra, December 1976.
15. Dobratz, B. A. and Kourvetaris, G.A., "The Present State
and Development of Sociology of the Military," Journal of
Political and Military Sociology , v. 4 (Spring)"^ pp. 67-
105, 1976.
16. Doom, J. Van., The Soldier and Social Change , Sage
Publications, Beverly Hills, 1975.
17. Dunwell, R. P., "Erosion of an Ethic," U. S. Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings , v. 64, pp. 57-62, March 1977.
18. Fisher, C. E., "Don't Give Up The Regiment," The Army
Combat Forces Journal , v. 6, No. 5, pp. 26-28, December
1955.
19. Fisher, A. and Harford, M. , Trends in Enlistment Motivation ,
Manpower Research Report, MA73-lb, September 1973.
20. Ganoe, W. A., The History of the United States Army , Eric
Lundberg, Maryland, 1964.
21. Gard, R. G. , "The Military and American Society," Foreign
Affairs , v. 49, Number 4, pp. 698-710, July 1971
22. Gelber, H. G., Problems of Australian Defence , Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Melbourne, 1970.
23. Gellerman, S. W. , Management by Motivation , American Manage-
ment Association, Inc., 1968.





25. Hackel, E., "Military Manpower and Political Purpose, Adelphi
Papers, No. 72," London: Institute for Strategic Studies
,
pp. 1-34, 1970.
26. Harries-Jenkins, G., "From Conscription to Volunteer Armies,
Adelphi Papers, No. 103," London: Institute for Strategic
Studies, pp. 11-16, 1973.
119

27. Hollister, C. W. , The Military Organization of Norman
England , The Claredon Press, Oxford, 1965.
28. Huntington, S. P., The Soldier and the State: The
Theory and Politics" of Civil-Military Relations , The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
1964.
29. Janowitz, M. , The Professional Soldier: A Social and
Political Portrait , The Free Press, New York, 1960.
30. Janowitz, M. , "Volunteer Armed Forces and Military Purpose,"
Foreign Affairs , v. 50, pp. 427-443, April 1972.
31. Janowitz, M. , "Toward an All-Volunteer Military," The Public
Interest , v. 27, pp. 104-117, Spring 1972.
32. Janowitz, M. , "The U. S. Forces and the Zero Draft, Adelphi
Papers, No. 94," London: Institute for Strategic Studies
,
pp. 1-30, 1973.
33. Johannessen, L. C, Women Management , DRRI Army Phase II
RB4-2, 10 May 1976.
34. Killian, R. A., Human Resource Management An ROI Approach
,
AMACOM, New York, 1976.
35. Kim, K. H., Farrell, S., and Clague, E., The All-Volunteer
Army: An Analysis of Demand and Supply , Praeger Publishers,
New York, 1971.
36. Kirchheimer, 0., "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary
Breakthroughs," The American Political Science Review , v.
LIX, pp. 964-974, 1965.
37. Knorr, K., "The United States: Social Change and Military
Power, Adelphi Papers, No. 71," London: Institute for
Strategic Studies
, pp. 1-12, 1970.
38. Lee, G. , "Britain's Professionals," Army
, pp. 28-33, July 1971
39. Levinson, P., "Asinine Attitudes Toward Motivation," Harvard
Business Review
, v. 20, pp. 70-76, January-February 1973.
40. Little R. , "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance,"
Janowitz, M. ed : The New Military. Norton and Company,
New York, pp. 195-223, 1964.
120

41. Little, R. W. , Selective Service and American Society
,
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1969.
42. Lockmiller, D. A., Enoch H. Crowder , Columbus: University
of Missouri Studies, 1955.
43. Mayew, W. L. , The Regimental System in the United States
Army: Its Evolution and Future , Master of Military Arts
and Science, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College,
Fort Leavenworth, 1976.
44. McClelland, D. C, "Money as a Motivator: Some Research
Insights," The McKinsey Quarterly
, pp. 366-377, Fall 1967.
45. Moskos, C. C, "Why Men Fight," Transaction
, pp. 13-23,
November 196 9.
46. Moskos, C. C, "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional
or Plural?", Trager, F., and Kronenberg, P., ed : National
Security and American Society. University Press of Kansas
,
pp. 536-549, 1973.
47. Mulliken, J., "Humanizing the U. S. Military," Time , v.
96, No. 25, pp. 16-22, December 21, 1970.
48. National Technical Information Service, HI-1647-RR, Ideas
and Trends for the Modern Volunteer Army , by Singer, M.
,
et. al., June 1972.
49. Paget, J., "The British Regimental System," Combat Forces
Journal , v. 4, No. 11, pp. 30-32, June 1954.
50. Rosser, R. F., "Civil-Military Relations in the 1980's,"
Military Review , v. LII, No. 3, pp. 18-31, March 1972.
51. Rosser, R. F., "A 20th Century Military Force," Foreign
Policy
,
v. 12, pp. 156-175, Fall 1973.
52. Stouffer, S. A., and others, The American Soldier , Volume
II: Combat and Its Aftermath, Princeton University Press,
1949.
53. Tax, S., The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives,
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966.
54. Towell, P., "After 4 Years: Concern Over Volunteer Army,"
Congressional Quarterly Inc.




55. U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975 , U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D~. C. , December 1976.
56. U. S. Army, Women in the Army Study Group, Women in the
Army
,
(Draft), Washington, D. C., August 1976.
57. U. S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed
Force, Report , U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D. C, February 20, 1970.
58. Waldman, E., The Goose Step is Verboten: The German Army
Today , The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.
59. Weigley, R. F., History of the United States Army
,
Macmillan Co., New York, 1967.






1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93 94
3. Department Chairman, Code 54 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Professor J. W. Creighton, Code 54Cf 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. CDR R. A. McGonigal, Code 54Mb 2
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940





7. Professor J. Arima, Code 54Aa 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93 940
8. LT GEN D. B. Dunstan, CB CBE MBE 1
Army Chief of the General Staff
Russell Offices
Canberra, ACT 2 600
Australia
9. Colonel M. J. Lamborn 1
Deputy Director of Supply
P. 0. Box 1932R




10. Mr. R. Elster
1667 Westwind Way
McLean, Virginia 22101




12. Australian Army Attache
1601 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.







Department of Defence Library
Russell Offices
Canberra, ACT 2 6 00
Australia
15. The Librarian
Department of Defence (Army Office) Library
Campbell Park Offices
Canberra, ACT 2 6 00
Australia
16. Pers 61
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Washington, D. C. 20370
17. Pers 62
Bureau of Naval Personnel

















The U. S. all
volunteer army: a
societal commentary to
its evolution and its
future.
thesB8525
The U.S. all volunteer army
i ii inn i ii nil
3 2768 002 07917
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
